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ABSTRACT

Hardware/Software (HW/SW) interfaces are pervasive in modern computer systems. Most of HW/SW interfaces are implemented by devices and their device
drivers. Unfortunately, HW/SW interfaces are unreliable and insecure due to
their intrinsic complexity and error-prone nature. Moreover, assuring HW/SW
interface reliability and security is challenging. First, at the post-silicon validation
stage, HW/SW integration validation is largely an ad-hoc and time-consuming
process. Second, at the system deployment stage, transient hardware failures and
malicious attacks make HW/SW interfaces vulnerable even after intensive testing
and validation.
In this dissertation, we present a comprehensive solution for HW/SW interface
assurance over the system life cycle. This solution is composited of two major
parts. First, our solution provides a systematic HW/SW co-validation framework
which validates hardware and software together; Second, based on the co-validation
framework, we design two schemes for assuring HW/SW interfaces over the system life cycle: (1) post-silicon HW/SW co-validation at the post-silicon validation
stage; (2) HW/SW co-monitoring at the system deployment stage.
Our HW/SW co-validation framework employs a key technique, conformance
checking which checks the interface conformance between the device and its reference model. Furthermore, property checking is carried out to verify system properties over the interactions between the reference model and the driver. Based on

ii
the conformance between the reference model and the device, properties hold on
the reference model/driver interface also hold on the device/driver interface. Conformance checking discovers inconsistencies between the device and its reference
model thereby validating device interface implementations of both sides. Property
checking detects both device and driver violations of HW/SW interface protocols.
By detecting device and driver errors, our co-validation approach provides a systematic and eﬃcient way to validate HW/SW interfaces.
We developed two software tools which implement the two assurance schemes:
DCC (Device Conformance Checker), a co-validation framework for post-silicon
HW/SW integration validation; and CoMon (HW/SW Co-monitoring), a runtime
veriﬁcation framework for detecting bugs and malicious attacks across HW/SW
interfaces. The two software tools lead to discovery of 42 bugs from four industry
hardware devices, the device drivers, and their reference models. The results have
demonstrated the signiﬁcance of our approach in HW/SW interface assurance of
industry applications.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

MOTIVATION

Computer systems are pervasive ranging from smartphones to desktops and to
servers. Our daily life heavily depends on computer systems. For example, nowadays we intensively use tablets or laptops to access on-line banking account or
make purchase over the Internet. Moreover, we take the airplanes or cars, which
all embed electronic systems. Due to all these dependencies, computer systems
must be reliable and secure.
Hardware/Software (HW/SW) interfaces are pervasive in these computer systems. For example, about 70% Linux kernel implements device drivers [14] for operating hardware devices and in Windows XP, there are over 35,000 device drivers
with over 100,000 versions of hardware devices [43]. However, HW/SW interfaces
are unreliable and insecure. Most system failures are caused by incorrect interactions between the devices and their drivers [51]. In Windows XP, about 85%
system failures are caused by driver errors [55] and there are seven times more
driver failures than the errors caused by the rest part of Linux kernel [14]. To
exacerbate these matters, many of these failures are transient. They disappear on
a system reboot, often to resurface at a later time. What is even worse, the pervasive, deeply embedded, and strongly connected nature of these systems makes
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them increasingly vulnerable to malfunctions, malicious attacks, and tampering.
Regarding to the error-prone and vulnerable nature of HW/SW interfaces, eﬀective
HW/SW interface reliability and security assurances are highly desired.

1.2

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Assuring HW/SW interface reliability and security is diﬃcult, not only due to the
intrinsic complexity of HW/SW interfaces, but also because of various challenges
posted at diﬀerent stages of the system development life cycle. Generally, eﬀective
HW/SW interface assurance is highly needed in two major stages of the system
life cycle: (1) system validation/testing stage; (2) system deployment stage. At
the system validation/testing stage, hardware and software are integrated once
the ﬁrst version of the silicon hardware prototype is available. Such a stage where
validations are conducted on the real silicon prototype is also denoted as the postsilicon validation stage. At the system deployment stage, HW/SW interfaces have
been released and deployed with the system to the end-users. We discuss the
diﬃculties and challenges at these two stages respectively.
1.2.1

Challenges at Post-silicon Validation Stage

New computer systems like smartphones and tablets, are entering the market place
at an ever-accelerating pace. This brings enormous pressures on the product development teams to shorten the time-to-market. Moreover, according to recent
industry reports [29], validation accounts for nearly 60% of the overall product
cost. At the post-silicon validation stage, HW/SW integration validation, validating hardware and software together, is a major component of system validation. A
recent study [4] indicates that the cost of HW/SW integration validation has experienced signiﬁcant increases. Therefore, regarding to the time-to-market pressure,
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eﬀective HW/SW integration validation is required. However, currently HW/SW
integration validation largely involves ad-hoc and manual work. There are several
key challenges:
1. Lack of HW/SW interface observation. HW/SW integration validation
often relies on testing the entire system with high-level application test scenarios. However, HW/SW interfaces are often not suﬃciently observed and
certain interface bugs escape detection. For example, unspeciﬁed bit-ﬂipping
in hardware interfaces often posts security threats and incurs unnecessary
power consumptions. However, without observing these bits in a systematic
and eﬃcient manner, these bugs are not detected.
2. Diﬃculty in attributing HW/SW interface bugs. When a bug is
discovered in HW/SW integration validation, it is often unclear if it is a
hardware or software bug, due to the close involvement and interaction of
both hardware and software. For example, an invalid software command
to the hardware could trigger the hardware to hang. However, such a bug
usually appears as a hardware bug rather than a software bug as the hardware
stops responding to any new command.
3. Diﬃculty in debugging HW/SW interfaces. Hardware interacts with
its control software frequently, producing a huge number of I/O events. To
troubleshoot, the engineers usually have to sift through thousands of I/O
events and analyze them manually. To exacerbate this situation, as hardware
and software share a large range of I/O interface registers or memory, it is
often diﬃcult to pinpoint the location of the bug. For example, Intel PCI
Ethernet adapter e1000 has 128KB I/O interface memory and produces more
than ten thousands of I/O events just for bringing up the driver. When an
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error occurs, engineers often manually analyze each driver requests, which
incurs signiﬁcant human eﬀort.
1.2.2

Challenges at System Deployment Stage

At the system deployment stage, HW/SW interfaces are still vulnerable even after
many iterations of validation and testing. There are two major reasons. First,
transient hardware failures are common. According to several reports [3, 5, 48],
a signiﬁcant number of reported failures cannot be reliably reproduced under the
same stimuli triggering the failures. Most of them are transient errors. Second, recently HW/SW interfaces have become a major target of malicious attacks, entailing serious security threats. For example, the infamous Stuxnet worm speciﬁcally
targets the interactions between programmable logic controllers and their control
software, ushering in a new era for virus and worm attacks [59]. Furthermore,
globalization of computer system production generates major concerns about potential security backdoors planted in devices and drivers, which are increasingly
produced by third-party suppliers who may not be fully trustworthy [17].
Summary. Given the ubiquity and seriousness of these challenges at both the
post-silicon validation stage and the system deployment stage, it is highly desired to develop systematic methods to validate HW/SW interfaces and automatically detect and analyze interface bugs. Moreover, even after extensive validation,
HW/SW interfaces still need to be continuously protected against hardware transient failures and malicious attacks.

1.3

OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH

In this dissertation, we present a comprehensive solution for assuring HW/SW
interface reliability and security over the life cycle of computer systems. This
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solution is composited of two major parts: (1) HW/SW co-validation framework;
(2) Two HW/SW interface assurance schemes: post-silicon HW/SW co-validation
and HW/SW co-monitoring. The HW/SW co-validation framework is central to
our assurance solution, which validates HW/SW interactions. The two assurance
schemes apply the co-validation framework in diﬀerent fashions at the post-silicon
validation stage and the system deployment stage respectively.
1.3.1

HW/SW Co-validation Framework

Our co-validation framework employs a key technique, conformance checking, which
checks the conformance between a device and its reference model. The general work
ﬂow of conformance checking has three steps: (1) recording the driver requests issued to the device and the device interface state before each request. Essentially
we record a sequence of driver requests with device interface states. We denote
such a sequence as a device trace; (2) executing the reference model by taking
the recorded driver request sequence; (3) checking if there are any inconsistencies
in interface states between the device and the reference model. By discovering
their inconsistencies, conformance checking validates device interface implementations of both the device and the reference model. Through conformance checking,
the reference model shadows the device execution. Beyond conformance checking,
we conduct property checking which veriﬁes system properties over the reference
model and driver interactions. As the reference model shadows the device execution, properties hold on the reference model and driver interface also hold on the
device/driver interface. Property checking discovers both device and driver violations of HW/SW interface protocols. Through the two-tier checking infrastructure,
our framework essentially validates the device/driver interactions.
Workﬂow. Figure 1.1 presents the workﬂow of our co-validation approach. We
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Figure 1.1: Workﬂow of conformance and property checking
implement conformance and property checking in the engine, conformance and
property checker (CPC). It takes a device trace captured from the target device/driver interface, the reference model, and the system properties as inputs. CPC
carries out conformance and property checking over the device trace and outputs
driver and device bug reports. CPC can be conducted in two manners: (1) oﬀ-line
checking: the device trace is saved into trace ﬁles and CPC does conformance and
property checking oﬀ-line; (2) on-line monitoring: the device trace is captured
from device/driver interface at runtime while CPC does conformance and property checking over the captured device trace simultaneously. Based on the two
manners, we develop two assurance schemes for diﬀerent stages of the system life
cycle respectively (see Section 1.3.2).
Our framework entails four major techniques which are the key technical contributions of this dissertation research. These techniques are described as follows.
1. Conformance checking with reference models. Conformance checking detects the inconsistencies between the device and the reference model
by simulating the device behaviors over the reference model [38]. We use
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a technique, symbolic execution [31], to simulate the device behaviors on
the reference model. Symbolic execution is used to overcome the limited
observability of hardware silicon. In HW/SW integration validation, the device internal registers are generally not observable. Moreover, the external
environment inputs to the device are also hard to capture. Conformance
checking models them using variables with symbolic values when replaying
the recorded device trace on the device. In this way, symbolic execution
covers all the possible values of the internal registers and the external environment inputs.
2. Property checking. The property checker veriﬁes these system properties
over the device indirectly through the reference model. Based on the conformance between the device and the reference model, the property veriﬁed on
the reference model and the driver also holds on the device and the driver.
Property checking helps detect both device and driver errors in device/driver
interactions.
3. Adaptive concretization. Symbolic execution helps us overcome the limited observability challenge. However, it introduces signiﬁcant overhead as it
usually explores a large number of program paths, which makes conformance
checking a time-consuming process. To address this challenge, we propose
an optimization, adaptive concretization, to reduce the overhead of symbolic
execution [36]. We exploit the fact that most of the virtual prototype states
conforming to the device state are generated by an execution path accessing
none of or only a few of symbolic values. Adaptive concretization eliminates unnecessary symbolic values to prune unnecessary paths explored by
symbolic execution.
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4. Extended conformance checking of DMA interfaces. The original
conformance checking aims to detect inconsistencies on device interface registers. However, besides interface registers, Direct Memory Access (DMA)
I/O interfaces are also an important type of HW/SW interfaces. To validate
DMA interfaces, we extend the conformance checking by capturing DMA
interface states and detecting DMA interface inconsistencies between the device and the reference model [37].
1.3.2

HW/SW Interface Assurance Schemes

Our solution aims to provide HW/SW interface assurance over the computer system life cycle. As Section 1.2 illustrated, HW/SW interface assurance is required
in two major stages of the system life cycle: the post-silicon validation stage and
the system deployment stage. Moreover, each stage has speciﬁc requirements for
assurance since the system operates under diﬀerent environments and faces to
diﬀerent kinds of users. We list these requirements as follows.
1. Requirements of post-silicon validation stage. At the post-silicon
validation stage, both hardware and software evolve over many iterations.
This stage requires the integration validation to fully check each version of
HW/SW interfaces and detect as many bugs as possible from both sides.
While the validation is conducted, a large amount of test cases are issued
to manipulate the HW/SW interface in diﬀerent ways. As a result, a signiﬁcant number of traces are generated for analysis. Therefore, post-silicon
validation is often heavyweight and is required to be eﬀective in detecting
errors.
2. Requirements of system deployment stage. At the deployment stage,
the device and its driver have been released. The device and the driver are
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embedded into the production system and utilized by the end users. It is
often impossible to deploy the development-time validation tools with the device and the driver, and the validation overhead must be minimum. Therefore, HW/SW co-validation in this stage must be lightweight and detects
faults under runtime performance constraints.
To meet the diﬀerent requirements, we realize our HW/SW co-validation approach
in two assurance schemes respectively: (1) post-silicon HW/SW co-validation for
the development stage; (2) HW/SW co-monitoring for the deployment stage. Figure 1.2 illustrates how the two assurance schemes ﬁt into the system life cycle.
They utilize the same underlying techniques, conformance and property checking.
However, there are three key diﬀerences between these two schemes.
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Figure 1.2: Two schemes of HW/SW interface assurance

1. On-line and oﬀ-line. As Section 1.3.1 illustrated, conformance and property checking can be carried out in two manners: oﬀ-line and on-line. Postsilicon HW/SW co-validation is conducted in an oﬀ-line fashion. Since at the
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post-silicon validation stage, a signiﬁcant number of I/O events is produced
under intensive testing, the oﬀ-line approach does not introduce unnecessary runtime overhead and would not be disrupted by the system failures.
Oppositely, HW/SW co-monitoring is conducted as an on-line approach, as
the system failures should be caught immediately at runtime to protect the
target system.
2. Target device/driver interfaces. Post-silicon HW/SW co-validation validates the preliminary versions of drivers and the device prototypes which
are silicon chips. The co-validation mainly focuses on detecting design ﬂaws
in device/driver interfaces. HW/SW co-monitoring monitors the released
devices and drivers which have passed intensive testing process. Therefore,
HW/SW co-monitoring mainly focuses on detecting malicious exploits and
transient errors across device/driver interfaces at runtime.
3. Reference models. Comparing to our post-silicon HW/SW co-validation,
HW/SW co-monitoring uses a lightweight reference model which abstracts
unnecessary implementation details. The abstract reference model helps reduce runtime overhead introduced by conformance and property checking.
Our two assurance schemes have been realized in our two software tools, DCC
(Device Conformance Checker) and CoMon (HW/SW Co-monitoring) which implement our HW/SW co-validation approach. We applied our two software tools
to four real industry designs. DCC and CoMon discovered 42 non-trivial bugs from
devices, drivers, and the reference models. Moreover, CoMon has successfully detect all the malicious attacks across HW/SW interfaces.
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1.4

RELATED WORK

This dissertation work is related to HW/SW interface assurance, driver testing and
monitoring, device validation and testing, and symbolic execution with its related
optimizations.

1.4.1

HW/SW Interface Assurance

There has been much research on HW/SW interface assurance in the pre-silicon
veriﬁcation stage. HW/SW co-veriﬁcation and HW/SW co-simulation are two
mainstream techniques. In HW/SW co-veriﬁcation, model checking is widely
used [33, 39, 60, 41].

It veriﬁes properties by analyzing the interface imple-

mentation statically; however, it often encounters the state explosion problem.
Our co-validation framework conducts validation over the execution trace captured at runtime which largely avoids the state explosion problem. Research on
co-simulation [8, 20, 23, 25, 47, 50, 52] typically utilizes design models of the hardware and does not directly work with the implementation of the hardware/software
interfaces. Moreover, neither co-veriﬁcation nor co-simulation is conducted in the
real environment, particularly on the real silicon devices. Therefore, how to eliminate the false negatives and reproduce the detected bugs is often a major challenge.
Our approach is conducted on the real devices and drivers, all the detected bugs
are real bugs which have already occurred in the runtime system and these bugs
can be reproduced by replaying the I/O event sequence.
1.4.2

Driver Testing and Monitoring

Driver testing includes static analysis and dynamic testing. SDV [6] tests Windows device drivers through static analysis of driver programs. It discovers bugs
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that are related to incorrect usage of Windows Kernel API. This approach requires
Windows driver source code. Dynamic testing tools, such as Driver Veriﬁer [42],
veriﬁes the driver over the driver concrete execution trace. DDT [34], and SymDrive [49], discover driver bugs by simulating diﬀerent inputs to the target driver.
Both DDT and SymDrive use symbolic execution, to explore driver paths during testing. Runtime monitoring is an alternative approach to driver reliability
assurance. Nooks [54] uses a mechanism called “shadow driver” to monitor the
runtime behaviors of the target Linux driver and replace the real driver to handle
driver exceptions. A similar approach [30] monitors the driver at runtime and
checks if the driver can survive when taking the faulty device inputs. Several
other approaches [58, 19, 61, 24] monitor the driver and use software module isolation techniques to prevent driver errors from aﬀecting operating systems. All
such driver quality assurance research focuses on detecting memory access failures, invalid kernel API usages, and how to protect the kernel from driver failures.
They seldom consider the device behaviors when testing the driver. Other approaches [30, 34] do analyze the hardware interface inputs at certain points of the
driver execution. However, without monitoring the critical part of device interfaces
and fully exploring the device states, device and driver violations of the HW/SW
interface protocol are often missed.

1.4.3

Device Testing and Validation

Device testing and validation are usually carried out at the post-silicon stage.
Post-silicon validation is performed on silicon prototypes and testing devices. A
signiﬁcant amount of research has been focused on detecting and localizing bugs in
silicon chips. A major diﬃculty of post-silicon bug detection and localization is the
limited observability of silicon hardware internals. Several approaches [1, 46] have
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developed hardware on-chip monitors to collect hardware execution traces with internal signals. Assertion-based veriﬁcation [11, 26, 44] and formal method [18] have
been used to analyze and debug the execution traces from on-chip monitors. Our
approach also works on detecting and troubleshooting post-silicon bugs. Instead
of validating internal implementations of silicon hardware, we focus on HW/SW
interfaces.
In summary, current device and driver testing/validation methods mainly focus on one side of the HW/SW interface, rather than validating their integration
together. However, as devices and drivers are highly correlated by nature and their
interactions often follow complicated protocols. Discrete testing and validation are
not eﬀective in detecting HW/SW interface errors.

1.4.4

Symbolic Execution

Symbolic execution [31] is widely used for software testing. SAGE [22], KLEE
[12], and S2E[13] use symbolic execution to test software systems that intensively
interact with environments. Other tools [57, 53, 7] also employ symbolic execution
to generate test cases for testing software programs. Symbolic execution often
suﬀers from the path explosion problem. There has been many research targeting
reducing the overhead of symbolic execution. A major eﬀort has been to avoid
path explosions by pruning redundant paths. RWSet [10] and path subsumption [2]
employ a similar heuristic whereas a path which is identical to the one previously
explored can be safely pruned. In [35], a method is proposed for automatically
merging states to reduce the number of paths explored in symbolic execution.
Several other approaches [21, 53, 56] leverage the beneﬁts of concolic execution to
partially concretize the target programs thereby the number of explored paths is
reduced. In our adaptive concretization, we reduce the number of explored paths
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by concretizing some of the variables with symbolic values.

1.5

DISSERTATION OUTLINE

The reminder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
the background of our research. Chapter 3 presents our post-silicon HW/SW covalidation including conformance and property checking. Chapter 4 elaborates
on how we extend our post-silicon HW/SW co-validation framework to validate
DMA interfaces. Chapter 5 presents our optimization algorithm of conformance
checking. Chapter 6 presents the HW/SW co-monitoring for HW/SW interface
assurance at the system deployment stage. In Chapter 7, we conclude and discuss
the future directions.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND

In this chapter, we introduce some relevant concepts: QEMU virtual devices which
we adopt as our virtual prototypes, Formal Device Model (FDM) which is used as
the reference model in HW/SW co-monitoring, and symbolic execution with which
we replay driver requests on virtual devices and FDMs.

2.1

QEMU AND VIRTUAL DEVICES

QEMU [9] is a virtual machine that can emulate diﬀerent processor architectures,
such as x86, SPARC, and ARM. It also emulates virtual devices for diﬀerent peripheral devices, e.g., network adapters and mass storage devices.
A QEMU virtual device is a software component integrated into QEMU. We
illustrate the virtual device concept with the Intel e1000 network adapter, a PCI
(Peripheral Component Interconnect) device. As Figure 2.1 shows, the e1000 virtual device has the following major components:
• PCI device state, as deﬁned by E1000State, which keeps track of the PCI
device state;
• Device conﬁguration, as deﬁned by e1000 inf o, which stores the PCI conﬁguration information for this device (multiple conﬁgurations may be provided);
• PCI device functions: (1) the entry functions such as e1000 mmio writel
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typedef struct E1000State_st {

static PCIDeviceInfo e1000_info = {

PCIDevice dev;

.qdev.name

= "e1000",

NICState *nic;

.qdev.desc

= "Intel Gigabit Ethernet",

NICConf conf;

.vendor_id

= PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL,

uint32_t mac_reg[0x8000];

.device_id

= E1000_DEVID,

uint16_t phy_reg[0x20];

.revision

= 0x03,

uint16_t eeprom_data[64];

.class_id

= PCI_CLASS_NETWORK_ETHERNET,

......

......

} E1000State;

};

static void e1000_mmio_writel(void *opaque, phys_addr_t addr, uint32_t val)
{
switch(addr){
case E1000_TDT:
set_tdt(s, addr, val); break;
......
}
}
static void set_tdt(E1000State *s, int index, uint32_t val)
{
s->mac_reg[index] = val;
start_xmit(s);
}
static void start_xmit(E1000State *s)
{ ...... }
static ssize_t
e1000_receive(VLANClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,

size_t size)

{ ...... }

Figure 2.1: Excerpts from the e1000 QEMU virtual device.
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which are invoked by the QEMU VM when the driver issues I/O commands;(2) the interface functions such as set tdt which are invoked through
the entry functions; (3) the module functions, for example, start xmit and
e1000 receive, which model the device internal transactions such as packet
transmission and reception.

2.2

FORMAL DEVICE MODEL

A FDM is an executable transaction-level model, specifying HW/SW interfaces and
hardware functionalities [41]. It is derived from the device speciﬁcation and written
in a restricted subset of the C language with three key extensions: transaction,
non-determinism, and relative atomicity.
Transaction. The FDM focuses on the design logic rather than the implementation details of HW/SW interfaces and hardware functionalities. For example, a
data-transfer command is usually processed in multiple clock cycles; however, from
the perspective of the software, it may only be necessary to describe this command
as one hardware state transition. We deﬁne a hardware transaction to represent a
hardware state transition in an arbitrarily long but ﬁnite sequence of clock cycles.
Hardware transactions are atomic to software.
Non-determinism. A FDM utilizes non-determinism mainly in two ways: (1)
updating the state variables, which contributes to the data ﬂow of the speciﬁcation;
(2) deciding the conditions of branches or loops, which contributes to the control
ﬂow of the speciﬁcation. For both ways, the use of non-determinism abstracts away
unnecessary details. For example, one important utilization of non-determinism is
how a FDM models the hardware concurrency.
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• Non-deterministic interleaving. Hardware is concurrent in nature. For example, a network card processes driver commands and receives data concurrently. To specify such hardware concurrency, FDMs use a method, namely
non-deterministic interleaving, which has three steps: (1) identify the
concurrent modules (e.g., command unit, receive unit, etc.) of the target
hardware device; (2) specify the modules using separate C functions which
are deﬁned as module functions; (3) non-deterministically invoke these module functions in a hardware transaction function. When the transaction
function is executed multiple times, these module functions are executed in
a non-deterministic sequence. From the view point of software, the eﬀect of
hardware concurrency is modeled by the set of hardware states after nondeterministic many executions of the hardware transaction function.
Relative atomicity. Relative atomicity has two key ideas: (1) hardware transactions are atomic from the viewpoint of software; and (2) Interrupt Service Routines
(ISRs) are atomic to other lower-priority software routines. In device/driver interactions, when hardware ﬁres an interrupt, the OS calls the ISRs that are registered
in the interrupt vector table sequentially until an ISR acknowledges its ownership
of the interrupt. During this process, only one ISR can run at a time and other
hardware interrupts are suppressed. The interrupted thread can continue its execution only after the interrupting ISR terminates.

2.3
2.3.1

BÜCHI PUSHDOWN SYSTEM (BPDS)
Büchi Automaton (BA).

A BA B [32] is a non-deterministic ﬁnite state automaton accepting inﬁnite input
strings. Formally, B = (Σ, Q, δ, q0 , F ), where Σ is the input alphabet, Q is the
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ﬁnite set of states, δ ⊆ (Q × Σ × Q) is the set of state transitions, q0 ∈ Q is the
initial state, and F ⊆ Q is the set of ﬁnal states. B accepts an inﬁnite input string
iﬀ it has a run over the string that visits at least one of the ﬁnal states inﬁnitely
often. A run of B on an inﬁnite string s is a sequence of states visited by B when
σ

taking s as the input. We use q → q  to denote a transition from state q to q  with
the input symbol σ. A FDM is modeled as a BA, capturing device behaviors.
2.3.2

Labeled Pushdown System (LPDS).

A LPDS P [40] is a tuple (I, G, Γ, Δ, g0 , ω0 ) where I is the input alphabet, G is
a ﬁnite set of global states, Γ is a ﬁnite stack alphabet, Δ ⊆ (G × Γ) × I × (G × Γ∗ )
is a ﬁnite set of transition rules, and g0 , ω0  is the initial conﬁguration. LPDS
can take inputs, which is diﬀerent from PDS. A LPDS transition rule is denoted
τ

as g, γ → g  , w, where τ ∈ I and ((g, γ), τ, (g  , w)) ∈ Δ. A conﬁguration of P
is a pair g, ω, where g ∈ G is a global state and w ∈ Γ∗ is a stack content. The
set of all conﬁgurations is denoted by Conf (P). A device driver is modeled as a
LPDS.
2.3.3

Büchi Pushdown System (BPDS).

A BPDS BP [40] is deﬁned as the Cartesian product of a BA B and a LPDS P:
(1) the input alphabet of B is deﬁned as the power set of the set of propositions
that may hold on a conﬁguration of P (i.e. a symbol in Σ is a set of propositions);
(2) the input alphabet of P is deﬁned as the power set of the set of propositions
that may hold on a state of B (i.e. a symbol in I is a set of propositions); and (3)
two labeling functions is deﬁned as follows:
• LP2B : (G × Γ) → Σ, associates the head of a LPDS conﬁguration with the
set of propositions that hold on it. Given a conﬁguration c ∈ Conf (P), we
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a: α, b: β
TRUE

void foo(int a, int b)
{
1:





if (a > 5)

2:

b = b + 1;

3:

else

4:

b = b - 1;

a: α, b: β
α>5

a: α, b: β
α<=5





a: α, b: β+1
α>5

a: α, b: β-1
α<=5

}

Figure 2.2: An example of symbolic execution.
write LP2B (c) instead of LP2B (head(c)) for simplicity.
• LB2P : Q → I, associates a state of B with the set of propositions that hold
on it.
BP = ((G × Q), Γ, Δ , (g0 , q0 ), ω0 , F  ) is constructed by taking the Cartesian
σ

product of B and P. A BPDS rule (g, q), γ →BP (g  , q  ), ω ∈ Δ iﬀ q → q  ∈ δ,
τ

σ ⊆ LP2B (g, γ) and g, γ → g  , w ∈ Δ, τ ⊆ LB2P (q). A conﬁguration of BP is
referred to as (g, q), ω ∈ (G × Q) × Γ∗ . The set of all conﬁgurations is denoted
as Conf (BP). The labeling functions deﬁne how B and P synchronize with each
other. (g0 , q0 ), ω0  is the initial conﬁguration. (g, q), ω ∈ F  if q ∈ F . Basically,
the combination of the device and the driver is modeled as a BPDS, where the
driver is modeled as LPDS, the device is modeled as BA, and their interactions
are captured by labeling functions LP2B and LB2P . A path of BP is a sequence of
BPDS conﬁgurations, c0 ⇒BP c1 . . . ⇒BP ci ⇒BP . . ., where ci ∈ Conf (BP), i ≥ 0.
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2.4

SYMBOLIC EXECUTION

Symbolic execution [31] executes a program with symbolic values as inputs instead
of concrete ones and represents the values of program variables as symbolic expressions. Consequently, the outputs computed by the program are expressed as
functions of input symbolic values. The symbolic state of a program includes the
symbolic values of program variables, a path condition, and a program counter.
The path condition is a Boolean expression over the symbolic inputs; it accumulates constraints which the inputs must satisfy for the symbolic execution to follow
the particular associated path. The program counter points to the next statement
to be executed. A symbolic execution tree captures the paths explored by the
symbolic execution of a program: the nodes represent the symbolic program states
and the arcs represent the state transitions.
We use the program in Figure 2.2 to illustrate how symbolic execution is conducted. At the entry, a and b have symbolic values α and β, respectively, the
path condition is TRUE, and the program counter is 1. At the branching point, the
path condition is updated with conditions on the inputs to select between the two
alternative paths. At an assignment statement, the symbolic value of the relevant
variable is updated.
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Chapter 3
POST-SILICON HW/SW CO-VALIDATION

3.1

MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW

Post-silicon validation is a critical stage in the system life cycle. In this stage, not
only hardware silicon validation is conducted, but also HW/SW integration validation. A recent study [4] indicates that the cost of HW/SW integration validation
has increased signiﬁcantly. As the complexities of systems grow, there are several
key challenges in the post-silicon integration validation:
1. Lack of HW/SW interface observation. In HW/SW integration validation, HW/SW are combined together and treated as a black box. To test
hardware and software combination, some common test scenarios are created
and issued from high-level applications. The testers can discover some bugs
by observing if there are any system errors or crashes. Nevertheless, HW/SW
interfaces are often not suﬃciently observed and certain interface bugs will
not be detected.
2. Diﬃculty in attributing HW/SW interface bugs. When a bug is
discovered in HW/SW integration validation, it is often unclear if it is a
hardware bug or a software bug due to the close involvement and interaction
of both hardware and software.
3. Diﬃculty in debugging HW/SW interfaces. Hardware interacts with
its control software frequently, producing a huge number of I/O events. To
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troubleshoot, the engineers usually have to sift through thousands of I/O
events and analyze them manually.
Regarding to these serious challenges of the HW/SW integration validation,
systematic and eﬀective validation approaches are highly desired to validate both
hardware and software together. To conduct an eﬀective co-validation over HW/SW
interfaces, a major challenge is how to design a reference model which can eﬀectively track the device behaviors. Recently, virtual prototyping has emerged as a
promising technique to enable early software development. A virtual prototype is
a system-level, executable software model of a hardware device with full observability. The device interface modeled by the virtual prototype is required to be
functionally equivalent to that of the silicon device. Thus, virtual prototypes can
be used as reference models and have a major potential in facilitating HW/SW
co-validation.
In this chapter, we present a HW/SW co-validation framework for post-silicon
HW/SW integration validation. We utilize the virtual prototype of the device as
a reference model for validating HW/SW interfaces. As Figure 3.1 shows, there
are two stages in our framework. We illustrate the two stages as follows.
1. Runtime recording: In the runtime recording stage, the device/driver
interactions are recorded, including the driver requests issued to the device
and the device interface state before each request. We denote the recorded
sequence of driver requests associated with the corresponding device interface
states as device trace. The framework saves the recorded device trace into
a trace ﬁle and inputs it to the conformance and property checker (CPC).
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2. Oﬀ-line checking: In the oﬀ-line checking stage, CPC takes the trace ﬁle,
the virtual prototype of the device, and system properties governing the device/driver interactions as inputs. CPC performs conformance checking and
property checking. As a result, it reports the discovered bugs on device/driver interfaces.
CPC implements a two-tier checking infrastructure: conformance checking and
property checking. Conformance checking checks the interface register conformance between the device and its virtual prototype, thereby validating the interface implementations of both sides. Through conformance checking, the virtual
prototype shadows the device execution. Property checking leverages the virtual
prototype to expose the device state transitions and veriﬁes the properties over
the virtual prototype/driver interactions. Based on the conformance between the
virtual prototype and the device, the properties violated in the virtual prototype/driver interface are also violated in the device/driver interface. By checking the
properties, invalid driver inputs to the device and invalid device interface state are
both detected.
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of post-silicon HW/SW co-validation
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Outline. The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents
our conformance checking between the device and its virtual prototypes. Section 3.3 illustrates the property checking based on conformance checking. In
Section 3.4, we present some implementation details for realizing our HW/SW
co-validation framework. Section 3.5 elaborates on experimental results.

3.2

CONFORMANCE CHECKING WITH VIRTUAL PROTOTYPES

We present the basic workﬂow of conformance checking [38]. As illustrated in
Figure 3.2, the workﬂow has two major components: a trace recorder and a conformance checker.
The trace recorder records the driver request sequence to the device. The
conformance checker replays the sequence on the virtual prototype and checks the
conformance. The discovered inconsistencies are recorded. An inconsistency record
contains the inconsistent registers, the driver request causing the inconsistency, and
the virtual prototype execution trace under the driver request.
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Figure 3.2: Workﬂow of conformance checking
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3.2.1

Preliminaries

Before discussing the details of this workﬂow, we ﬁrst introduce our notion of
conformance, which is deﬁned between the states of the device and its virtual
prototype. The state of the device is determined by the values of its interface and
internal registers. The interface registers of the device are observable while the
internal registers are generally not observable and are sometimes even unknown.
The virtual prototype is a model of the device. It models interface registers of the
device with a set RI of corresponding variables and deﬁnes a set RN of variables
to capture device internal behaviors. However, the variables in RN often have
no correspondence with the internal registers of the device. We deﬁne a virtual
prototype state as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A virtual prototype state is denoted as V ={VI , VN } where VI
is the device interface state, i.e., the assignments to variables in RI and VN is the
device internal state, i.e., the assignments to variables in RN .
We represent the device state with the same sets of variables: RI and RN .
The variables in RI are assigned values observed from the corresponding interface
registers of the device. The variables in RN are assigned symbolic values with no
constraints since the device internal is not observable.
Deﬁnition 3.2. A device state is denoted as S={SI , SN } where SI is the assignments to variables in RI and SN is the symbolic assignments to variables in
RN .
A concrete device state is a device state whose state variable values are all
concrete. A symbolic device state is a device state some of whose state variable
values are symbolic and there can also be constraints on these symbolic values. A
symbolic device state can be viewed as a set of concrete states. In our approach,
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we treat both V and S as symbolic states, which can be viewed as two set of
concrete device states, denoted as set(V ) and set(S) respectively. Based on this
generalization, Deﬁnition 3.3 deﬁnes the conformance between a device state and
a virtual prototype state.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (state conformance). A device state S and a virtual prototype state
V conform to each other if set(S) ∩ set(V ) = ∅.
To compute set(S) ∩ set(V ), we denote the device state variables as var1 , var2 ,
..., varn and the values of the state variables of S as V al(var1 )S , V al(var2 )S , ...,
V al(varn )S . We construct the expression of S as Expr(S): (var1 == V al(var1 )S )
∧ (var2 == V al(var2 )S ) ∧ ... ∧ (varn == V al(varn )S ). Similarly, assume the constraints of V as Cont(V ), the expression of V , Expr(V ), is (var1 == V al(var1 )V )
∧ (var2 == V al(var2 )V ) ∧ ... ∧ (varn == V al(varn )V )) ∧ Cont(V ). Given
Expr(S) and Expr(V ), set(S) ∩set(V )=∅ if and only if Expr(S) ∧ Expr(V ) is
satisﬁable.
3.2.2

Trace Recorder

The trace recorder captures: (1) each driver request issued to the device; (2) the
device interface state before each driver request is issued. A sequence of such
state-request pairs captured on the device can be viewed as a device trace. We
deﬁne such a device trace as T = SI0 , D0 , SI1 , D1 , ..., SIn , Dn , where the pair
SIk , Dk  (0 ≤ k ≤ n) represents a driver request Dk to the current device interface
state SIk .
3.2.3

Conformance Checking Algorithm

The conformance checker replays T on the virtual prototype using symbolic execution. Algorithm 3.1 presents this workﬂow. It takes a device trace T and a virtual
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prototype F as inputs. The conformance checking algorithm works as follows:
1. Initialize the virtual device state V0 to be S0 from T  and set k = 0.
2. Take the next driver request Dk of T  and symbolically execute the virtual
device from Vk on Dk . Symbolic execution may produce a set G of virtual
device states.
3. Check the conformance between G and Sk+1 (see below for details). If not
conforming, report an inconsistency; otherwise continue checking.
4. Set the virtual device state Vk+1 to be the silicon device state Sk+1 ; Increment
k and go to step 2.
5. The conformance checker terminates when it ﬁnishes the last driver request
of T  .
Algorithm 3.1 conformance checking(T , F )
1: T  ← convert trace(T )
2:

/* Take Sk , Dk  from T  */

3:

for k : 0 → n do

4:

/*Set VP state Vk to be device state Sk */

5:

V k ← Sk

6:

/*Symbolically execute VP by taking Dk at Vk state*/

7:

G ← sym exec(F, Vk , Dk )

8:

H ← conf ormance check(G, Sk+1 )

9:

if H == false then

10:
11:
12:

report incon()
end if
end for
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Major functions in Algorithm 6.1 are described below.
1. Given T = SI0 , D0 , SI1 , D1 , ..., SIn , Dn , function convert trace generates a new device trace T  = S0 , D0 , S1 , D1 , ..., Sn , Dn , where Sk (0 ≤
k ≤ n) is a device state derived from SIk . (cf. Deﬁnition 3.2).
2. Function sym exec symbolically executes the virtual prototype and generates
a set of virtual prototype states denoted as G = {gi | 0 ≤ i ≤ m}.
3. Function conf ormance check checks the conformance between G and the
next device state under Dk , denoted as Sk+1 . Deﬁnition 3.4 deﬁnes their conformance. If G and Sk+1 conform to each other, function conf ormance check
returns true, otherwise, it returns f alse.
4. When function conf ormance check returns f alse, there is an inconsistency
and function report incon reports the inconsistency.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Device Conformance). Given G = {gi | 0 ≤ i ≤ m} and Sk+1 ,
the virtual prototype and the device conform to each other at Dk if ∃gi ∈ G where
0 ≤ i ≤ m, set(Sk+1 ) ∩ set(gi ) = ∅ .
Discussions. Our conformance deﬁnition is essentially the conformance between
the interface states of the device and the virtual prototype since the internal variables of S have unconstrained symbolic values. Therefore, our algorithm may not
detect internal state non-conformance. Moreover, to reduce symbolic execution
complexities, we synchronize the virtual prototype state to the device state after
each drive request. This may miss inconsistencies that only surface after several
driver requests. Under this conformance deﬁnition, our approach is sound theoretically as symbolic execution explores all possible interface states of the virtual
prototype. Nevertheless in practice, for practicality and eﬃciency, our approach
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may introduce false positives, i.e., false alarms, due to optimizations of symbolic
execution (cf. Section 3.4.4). Furthermore, our approach might also miss some device bugs. For example, if the virtual prototype and the device have a same error,
this error will not be discovered. In Section 3.3, we will show property checking
can help us detect such errors.
3.3

PROPERTY CHECKING

This section overviews our property checking design [37]. Based on the conformance checking workﬂow described in Figure 3.2, we build a property checker over
the conformance checker in the oﬀ-line checking stage. As Figure 3.3 illustrates,
the property checker takes a trace ﬁle as its input, veriﬁes the system properties
over the device state transitions exposed by the conformance checker, and reports
property failures.
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Figure 3.3: Workﬂow of property checking
Property checking veriﬁes two types of properties: (1) stateless properties,
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the properties without involving device states; (2) stateful properties, the properties related to device states. Moreover, each type also contains two categories:
(1) device properties specifying how the device should behave in device/driver
interactions; (2) driver properties specifying how the driver should behave in device/driver interactions. As examples, we present four properties speciﬁed in the
eepro100 speciﬁcation [27] as follows.
Property 1: If some register bits are marked as ”reserved”, the driver cannot
set these bits.
Property 2: If some register bits are marked as ”reserved”, the device cannot
set these bits.
Property 3: If the device Command Unit (CU) is not in SUSPENDED status,
the driver cannot send RESUME to the device.
Property 4: If the driver does not require the device to ﬁre an interrupt
after the device completes the driver request, the device should never ﬁre such
an interrupt.
Properties 1 and 2 are stateless properties while properties 3 and 4 are stateful
properties. Moreover, failures of properties 1 and 3 indicate driver violation of
device/driver interface protocols while failures of properties 2 and 4 indicate device
errors.
Remark. Conformance checking can detect device violations of device/driver
interface protocols. However, as Section 3.2.3 mentioned, conformance checking
may miss some device errors. By verifying the device properties, property checking
essentially provides a way to detect some of the device errors missed in conformance
checking.
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3.3.1

Virtual Prototype Instrumentations

As we leverage the virtual prototype to infer the device state transitions, the virtual prototype can be directly used as a validation vehicle. For property checking,
we instrument the virtual prototype with assertions generated from speciﬁed properties. In this way, while the conformance checker simulates the device behaviors
on the virtual prototype, the property checker detects if any assertion fails during
the simulation. Currently, we instrument the assertions manually. In future, we
will develop a method that allows the users to specify assertions and automatically
instruments the virtual prototype with the assertions. Figure 3.4 shows the four
assertions corresponding to properties 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. A special API
function dcc assert is used to specify these assertions.
3.3.2

Detecting Assertion Failures

The property checker evaluates the assertions when the conformance checker executes the virtual prototype. Symbolic execution of the virtual prototype usually
explores multiple program paths, we denote such a set of paths as P = {pi | 0 ≤
i ≤ n}. Deﬁnition 3.5 deﬁnes the condition that the property checker detects a
property violation.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Property Violation). Given a property ψ, a set of paths P = {pi |
0 ≤ i ≤ n} explored under a driver request D, ψ is violated under D if ∀pi ∈ P ,
the assertion failure of ψ is reachable on pi .
The set P represents all the possible device behaviors under the driver request
D. Only if all of these possible behaviors lead to the violation of the property ψ,
the property checker can ensure there is an property violation in the device/driver
interface.
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static void eepro100_cu_command(EEPRO100State * s, uint8_t val)
{
// Assertion for property 1
dcc_assert(!val & RESERVED_BITS);

// Assertion for property 3
if (s->cu_state != CU_STATE_SUSPENDED)
dcc_assert(val != CU_CMD_RESUME);

......

// Assertion for property 2
dcc_assert(s->mac[CU_CMD] & RESERVED_BITS);
}

static void eepro100_write_mdi(EEPRO100State *s, uint32_t val)
{
......
// Assertion for property 4
if (!val & MDIC_INT)
{
dcc_assert(!s->mac[SCB_INT] & MDI_INT);
}
}

Figure 3.4: Assertions instrumented in the eepro100 virtual device
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Discussions. Our property checking has a major advantage in verifying stateful
properties. In the state of the art driver implementations, to runtime verify a
property related to the device states, the driver has to be instrumented to keep a
partial device state machine where only property-related states and corresponding
state transitions are modeled. This approach has three limitations: (1) modeling a
state machine for every property incurs redundant human eﬀorts; (2) ad-hoc state
machine instrumentation is intrusive to the driver implementation; (3) the state
transitions inferred by the driver are sometimes out of synchronous with the real
device state transitions, as the driver hardly checks the real device states. Our
approach leverages the virtual prototype to systematically model and maintain
the complete device state machine while the normal workﬂow of the device/driver
interface is not aﬀected. Furthermore, through conformance checking, the virtual
prototype is largely guaranteed to be synchronous with the device.

3.4

IMPLEMENTATION

This section presents the techniques for implementing our HW/SW co-validation
approach.
3.4.1

Selective Capturing

The trace recorder captures values of the interface registers of the device. However,
it is diﬃcult to capture all interface registers since a device often has a large range
of interface registers. For example, Intel e1000 network adapter, a PCI device,
has 128KB of interface registers. Capturing all these registers incurs excessive
memory transactions, which will heavily degrade the system performance. To
address this problem, we propose a method, namely selective capturing, which
captures a smaller set of important registers rather than the complete set.

35
To decide which registers to capture, we statically analyze the virtual prototype [16]: symbolically execute the virtual prototype by using symbolic inputs
and record the registers accessed in execution. As the registers can be accessed
by using symbolic addresses, which may lead to an unnecessarily large range of
registers to record. Therefore, we only record the registers accessed by concrete
addresses. This may miss certain registers. As a supplement, we allow the user to
specify which registers they want to capture. Selective capturing does not aﬀect
the soundness of our approach although it may miss inconsistencies.
3.4.2

Incremental Trace Recording

The trace recorder captures the device trace at runtime, which is a sequence of
driver requests associated with device interface states. In practice, testing a device
usually produces thousands of driver requests in a short period of time. As each
driver request corresponds to a set of captured registers, saving the complete device
trace would occupy a signiﬁcant amount of memory and disk space. Moreover,
in post-silicon HW/SW co-validation, the trace recorder is usually running on
a testing machine with the target device while the conformance checker can be
running on any other machines. Therefore, transferring a trace ﬁle from the testing
machine to the checking machine costs signiﬁcant time if the ﬁle size is large.
We observe that in a device trace, between two consecutive driver requests,
there is only a small number of interface registers whose values are changed. Based
on this observation, we develop an incremental trace recording method which only
records the interface registers whose values are changed instead of recording a
complete set of selected registers. This method has three steps:
1. Before the ﬁrst driver request D0 is issued, the trace recorder captures the
interface state SI0 and saves it in the device trace T .
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2. Before the driver requests Dk where the current device interface state is
SIk and 0 < k ≤ n, the trace recorder computes ΔSIk , where ΔSIk =
D(SIk , SIk−1 ). The function D returns the diﬀerent registers and their values
between SIk and SIk−1 . The trace recorder saves ΔSIk in T .
3. Given a device trace TΔ = SI0 , D0 , ΔSI1 , D1 , ..., ΔSIn , Dn , for ΔSIk (0 <
k ≤ n), the conformance checker recovers SIk by using function R where
R : {SIk−1 , ΔSIk } → SIk . In this way, the conformance checker recovers T
based on TΔ and conduct the conformance checking in the native way.
3.4.3

Harness Generation for Virtual Prototypes

A virtual prototype is not a stand-alone program, which is executed as part of
the virtual platform. Therefore, we need an execution harness for symbolically
executing the virtual prototype. We generate an execution harness based on the
concepts of non-deterministic interleaving and symbolic inputs.
• Non-deterministic interleaving. As Section 2.2 illustrates, to capture the
hardware concurrency, it requires non-deterministic many executions of a
loop where the module functions are invoked non-deterministically. We deﬁne
such a loop as the main loop of the execution harness. The condition of the
main loop is a non-deterministic choice and module functions are invoked
non-deterministically in the main loop.
• Symbolic inputs. As outside environment inputs are not captured from the
device, we assign symbolic values to these input variables so that symbolic
execution can cover the possible inputs from the outside environment.
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......
dcc_make_symbolic(buff, BUFF_SIZE, "buff");
dcc_make_symbolic(size, sizeof(uint32_t), "size");

//Non-deterministic many executions
while(choice()) {

//Non-deterministic interleaving
switch (choice()) {

// Respond to write/read registers
case 0:

Access_Register(); break;

// Receive packets
case 1:

e1000_receive(nc, buff, size); break;

// Do nothing
default:

break;

}
......

Figure 3.5: Excerpts of execution harness of e1000 virtual prototype
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Example. We illustrate harness generation using the e1000 network adapter. Figure 3.5 shows an excerpt from the harness we generate for the e1000 virtual prototype. There are two module functions: (1) Access Register; (2) e1000 receive.
The function Access Register models how the device responds to a driver request,
e.g., writing to or reading from a register. The function e1000 receive models
how the device receives packets from the network, which takes several input parameters. We call the function dcc make symbolic to assign symbolic values to
the input variables. The function choice() implements a non-deterministic choice
which returns a symbolic value. In the main loop, the two module functions are
invoked non-deterministically.
3.4.4

Termination of Symbolic Execution

Symbolic execution might not terminate when it encounters a loop without a statically known number of iterations, e.g., the main loop in the execution harness. We
refer to such a loop as an unbounded loop. To address this issue, we set constant
bounds for all such loops in the virtual prototype. We leverage runtime behaviors
of the virtual prototype in the QEMU virtual machine to decide the loop bound
for each unbounded loop. The method contains three steps:
1. We statically analyze the virtual prototype through symbolically executing
the virtual prototype using symbolic inputs, to identify the unbounded loops.
2. When the virtual prototype is running within the QEMU virtual machine,
for each unbounded loop identiﬁed by static analysis, we record the largest
number of iterations that the loop has been executed. If we encounter an unbounded loop while replaying the device trace, we use its recorded maximum
number of iterations as its bound.
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3. As a supplement, we allow the user to adjust the loop bound for a speciﬁc
loop. For example, if using a large bound induces high time and memory
costs or even path explosions, the user may lower the bound.
Remarks. Loop bounding may lead to false positives since it potentially reduces the virtual prototype behaviors. However, we argue that the false positive
ratio is low due to two reasons. First, static analysis shows that for most unbounded loops, increasing the numbers of loop iterations does not aﬀect the virtual prototype interface state. Therefore, the conformance checking result will not
be aﬀected most of the time. Second, the loop bounds cover most virtual prototype behaviors if the runtime test cases for identifying loop bounds have a high
coverage of the virtual prototype (herein we use the code coverage metrics such
as statement coverage). Moreover, a discovered false positive may be eliminated
thereafter by the user incrementing the loop bounds. However, since setting the
bounds too large may lead to high time and memory costs and even path explosions, sometimes false positives cannot be completely eliminated. Therefore, the
user may need to search for a “sweet spot” to achieve minimum false positives with
reasonable symbolic execution costs.
3.4.5

Implementation Details

Trace Recorder Implementation
We implement our post-silicon HW/SW co-validation on Linux. The trace recorder
is implemented as a Linux kernel library. A standard Linux device driver always
calls Linux kernel functions to access its device. For instance, a driver calls function
writel to write a long integer to a device register. We hook these kernel functions.
As a result, the trace recorder is invoked to record the driver requests when the
driver calls these functions to issue requests.
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Conformance and Property Checking
We construct our conformance and property checker using the symbolic execution
engine KLEE [12]. We modify KLEE in three aspects. First, we set the loop
bounds during symbolic execution. Second, we realize our own module for conformance and property checking. Third, KLEE is a testing tool rather than just a
symbolic execution engine. It provides some functionalities which are unnecessary
in our approach. We remove these functionalities from KLEE. For example, KLEE
generates test cases for the explored paths, which is not essential for symbolic execution. We remove this functionality to avoid the I/O operations during symbolic
execution.

3.5

EVALUATION

In this section, we present our evaluation results including two parts: (1) design
ﬂaws discovered in real industry designs; (2) performance of our post-silicon covalidation framework with optimizations of conformance checking.
3.5.1

Experiment Setup

All experiments were conducted on a workstation with a dual-core Intel Pentium D
Processor at 3.20 GHz and 4GB of RAM, running Linux with kernel version 2.6.35.
The devices evaluated are three types of widely used network adapters. We use
their QEMU virtual devices as the virtual prototypes. Information of these devices
and their virtual prototypes are summarized in Table 3.1. It also shows the size
of the registers we selectively capture in each network adapter. The virtual device
size is measured in Lines of Code (LOC). Intel e1000, Intel eepro100, and Realtek
rtl8139 virtual devices are included in QEMU 0.15.1 source code. Broadcom bcm
5751 virtual device is newly created following the QEMU 0.15.1 requirements.
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Table 3.1: Devices and virtual prototypes for HW/SW co-validation
Virtual Device Selective Captured
Devices
Size (LOC)

Size (Bytes)

Intel e1000 Gigabit NIC

2099

1224

Broadcom bcm5751 Gigabit NIC

4519

412

Intel eepro100 10/100M NIC

2178

74

3.5.2

Bug Detection

Inconsistencies and Device Bugs
Conformance checking of our framework discovered 26 inconsistencies between the
three network adapters and their virtual prototypes under test: 12 in e1000, 8 in
bcm5751, and 6 in eepro100. By analyzing the inconsistency reports generated by
the conformance checker, there are 22 bugs from the virtual devices, and 4 bugs
from the devices. As the result shows, most of these inconsistencies are caused by
the bugs of the virtual devices. This is because on one hand the devices are stable
products which have gone through extensive testing and bug-ﬁxing procedures; on
the other hand, their virtual prototypes are not heavily tested through any rigorous
testing procedures. However, these virtual prototype bugs are still possible to
appear in silicon prototypes at the early stage of hardware development, since these
bugs are common violations of hardware designs. We believe that if this approach
is conducted at the post-silicon validation stage before devices are released, it can
also discover many inconsistencies caused by the bugs of devices/prototypes.
Types of device bugs. We summarized the bugs which cause the inconsistencies.
As shown in Table 3.2, there are 9 types of device bugs we discovered by analyzing
the inconsistencies. Most of these bugs are very common violations of hardware
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designs. For example, ﬁring interrupts too many times and failing to ﬁre interrupts
are both common defects in hardware devices. We discuss the device bugs and the
virtual prototype bugs respectively.
• Device bugs. The bugs of the ﬁrst type are real device bugs. The device
updates the register speciﬁed as reserved in the device speciﬁcation. This
bug can be serious since it may cause unnecessary device behaviors, expose
additional device information, and consume extra power.

Reserved Bits/Registers are updated

Generate unnecessary interrupts

Fail to generate interrupts

Fail to clear interrupts

Fail to update registers

Update registers with wrong values

Two or more registers are out of sync.

Registers reset to incorrect values

Incorrect data types for modeling device states

VP does not model device concurrency

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Bug Description

1

No.

3

1

3

2

2

7

1

1

2

4

Num.

VP

VP

VP

VP

VP

VP

VP

VP

VP

Device

Device Type
e100, e1000

Distribution

eepro100, e1000, bcm5751

bcm5751

eepro100, e1000, bcm5751

bcm5751

e1000

eepro100, e1000, bcm5751

bcm5751

bcm5751

eepro100, e1000

Table 3.2: Types of bugs in virtual prototypes and devices
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static void
set_mdic(E1000State *s, int index, uint32_t val)
{
... ...
s->mac_reg[MDIC] = val |E1000_MDIC_READY;
set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICR_MDAC);
}

Figure 3.6: Excerpt of e1000 virtual device
• Virtual prototype bugs. The bugs of second to fourth types are all related to
interrupts. The bugs from the ﬁfth type to ninth type can cause the driver
to read incorrect values. These bugs often cause serious driver and system
errors or even crashes, and similar device errors have been reported [30].
Consequences of inconsistencies. These inconsistencies can have serious consequences. Here we use an inconsistency found in Intel e1000 as an example. In this
scenario, the device driver writes certain values to register MDIC to transfer data
into the internal module of the device. After the data transfer ﬁnishes, according
to the value of a speciﬁc bit in register MDIC, the device determines whether to ﬁre
an interrupt.
However, Figure 3.6 shows how the virtual prototype responds under such the
scenario by invoking the function set MDIC. In this function, no matter what is
the value of register MDIC, the virtual prototype always generates an interrupt by
invoking the interrupt function set ics. Due to this feature, the driver developed
on the virtual prototype may always expect an interrupt after the device ﬁnishes
transferring data. However, the device does not always generate an interrupt to
notify the driver when the data transfer is completed. Therefore, if the driver
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is not well written, it will treat no interrupt as an incorrect data transfer in the
device, and report an exception by mistake. The driver’s normal work ﬂow will be
disrupted on the device. By detecting such an inconsistency, our tool helps users
easily ﬁgure out why the driver does not work properly with the silicon device. This
case illustrates how our approach can help post-silicon device/driver co-debugging.

Property Checking and Driver Bugs
By using property checking, we detect two driver bugs shown in Table 3.3. Property
checking veriﬁed 31 properties in total, of which there are 10 stateless properties
and 21 stateful properties. These driver violations are harmful to the system.
Updating reserved and read-only registers are likely to incur unnecessary behaviors
of the devices.
Table 3.3: Summary of driver bugs
Bug Description
Update interface register

Num.
1

reserved bits
Update interfac register
read-only bits

Bug Types
Stateless

Distribution
eepro100

Property Violation
1

Stateless

e1000

Property Violation

Summary. The results demonstrated that our framework addresses the ﬁrst three
key challenges of HW/SW integration validation presented in Section 3.1. First,
our framework is eﬀective to detect the design ﬂaws in HW/SW interfaces. For
example, the discovered bug of updating the reserved bits can be easily missed if
the HW/SW interface is not observed. Second, our framework can easily identify
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a HW/SW interface bug as a hardware bug or a software bug. For example, an invalid driver input often appears like a device bug as the device usually hangs under
the invalid input. By detecting the invalid input through property checking, the
framework clearly identiﬁes this bug as a driver bug. Third, conformance checking and property checking are carried out automatically, which reduces signiﬁcant
human eﬀorts.
3.5.3

Eﬃciency

We evaluate the eﬃciency of our approach, in terms of time usages, memory usages,
and false positive ratios. We issue four kinds of test cases to the network adapters
to collect device traces. These test cases are all common usages of network adapters
as shown in Table 3.4. “NIC test-suite” contains a family of typical test cases on
network interface controllers (NIC), which manipulate a NIC in diﬀerent ways,
e.g., sending UDP packets and setting MTU size.
Table 3.4: Test cases for evaluating HW/SW co-validation
Test Cases

Description

Reset Network Interface Bring down and then bring up the network interface
Ping

Ping another network interface

Transfer ﬁles

Copy large ﬁles with total size 3.2 GB

NIC test-suite

A set of typical test cases on NIC

Time and memory usages
We evaluate the time and memory usages of conformance checking. Table 3.5
shows the results. The “Time Usage” column shows the average time usages for
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the conformance checker processing each driver request of the device trace collected
under the test cases. We also recorded the maximum values of memory usages.
Consider that our approach is an oﬄine checking approach, the time usage is
acceptable and the memory usage is low.
Table 3.5: Time and memory usages and false positives
Inconsistency
Devices

Time

Memory

Usage (sec)

Usage (MB)

(Discovered

Test Cases

/Veriﬁed)

e1000

bcm5751

eepro100

Reset NIC

0.24

212.60

8/8

Ping

2.92

300.00

8/8

Transfer ﬁles

3.11

308.14

12/9

NIC test-suite

3.06

288.23

11/11

Reset NIC

0.19

166.51

9/9

Ping

2.88

255.16

8/8

Transfer ﬁles

2.87

251.02

8/6

NIC test-suite

2.33

218.65

7/7

Reset NIC

0.26

207.73

4/4

Ping

2.10

220.15

2/2

Transfer ﬁles

2.45

236.77

2/2

NIC test-suite

2.31

226.84

4/4

False positive ratios
To assess the number of false positives introduced by our optimizations, we veriﬁed
all the inconsistencies discovered. In the “Inconsistency” column of Table 3.5, we
show the numbers of discovered inconsistencies and veriﬁed inconsistencies.
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Most of the inconsistencies are veriﬁed. We encountered false positives in the
traces of transferring ﬁles on e1000 and bcm5751 (marked as bold). Both virtual
prototypes have only one unbounded loop whose number of iterations aﬀects the
virtual prototype interface state. The number of iterations of the loop depends
on the total size of packets received by the device between two consecutive driver
requests. In the virtual prototype, one iteration of the loop would receive a ﬁxed
number of packets. Therefore, one iteration of the loop captures the device behaviors when the network traﬃc is modest. Occasionally when the network traﬃc is
heavy, it requires executing the loop more than once. Therefore, our setting the
bound to one produces false positives. Nevertheless, as we adjust the bound by
incrementing it to two, all previously encountered false positives are eliminated
while the time and memory costs remain modest. This demonstrates that (1)
our approach has a low false positive ratio; (2) The supplementary loop bounding
method is eﬀective in eliminating false positives.

3.6

SUMMARY

We have presented an approach to HW/SW co-validation at post-silicon stage.
This approach entails two checking techniques: (1) conformance checking with virtual prototypes; (2) property checking, which help detect errors in HW/SW interface implementations between a device and its driver. Our co-validation framework
can eﬀectively detect the bugs from the devices, the virtual prototypes, and the
drivers. Preliminary evaluation shows that our approach is useful and eﬃcient.
In three network adapters, we discover many bugs while incurring low memory
and time usages. Furthermore, our validation framework has major potential in
addressing the key challenges of HW/SW integration validation presented in Section 3.1. First, the framework records and validates the device interface state; thus
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the errors in the interface registers are eﬀectively detected. Second, the framework
identiﬁes both the device and driver errors over the device/driver interface thereby
it can easily attribute device/driver interface bugs as device or driver bugs. Finally, our framework only requires minimum manual eﬀorts, which signiﬁcantly
saves validation human eﬀorts.
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Chapter 4
HW/SW CO-VALIDATION FOR DMA INTERFACES

4.1

MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW

Direct Memory Access (DMA) is a way by which peripheral devices can directly
access the system memory without involving CPU. For most peripheral devices,
I/O interfaces based on Direct Memory Access (DMA) are a critical part of their
HW/SW interfaces. For example, in Intel EERPO100 Ethernet adapter speciﬁcation [27], 25% of all pages describe the DMA interface implementations. Therefore,
DMA interface validation is a critical task in HW/SW co-validation.
This chapter presents a HW/SW co-validation framework for validating DMA
interfaces. In general, a device interface includes interface registers and the DMA
interface. Chapter 3 presents an approach to conformance checking over device
interface registers. Our framework for validating DMA interfaces essentially extends the conformance checking in Chapter 3 to check the conformance on not only
interface registers but also the DMA interface. Thereby our extended approach
can detect not only DMA interface bugs but also new bugs in interface registers whose values have dependencies on DMA interface state. Nevertheless, the
straightforwardly extended conformance checking is not scalable to complicated
device designs due to two limitations:
1. Large overheads of recording DMA interface states. A DMA interface is essentially a shared memory between the device and its driver. The
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size of the DMA interface can be fairly large. For example, the Intel e1000
Ethernet adapter has 8 MB DMA memory. Therefore, recording the DMA
interface state, i.e., DMA memory state, under each driver request may heavily degrade system performance.
2. Missed bugs due to imprecise environmental input simulation. A
large part of DMA-based I/O involves handling the environmental inputs,
e.g., receiving data in an Ethernet adapter. As conformance checking does
not record environmental inputs, it cannot simulate the DMA operations
under environmental inputs precisely on the virtual prototype. As a result,
some DMA interface bugs are often missed (cf. Section 4.3).
To address the challenges above, we developed three key techniques: (1) recordon-write policy which records the DMA interface state only when it is updated;
(2) partial record which records part of a FIFO ring-based DMA memory instead of the complete ring; (3) environmental input prediction which predicts
when the device receives inputs from its external environment, thereby facilitating precise simulation of the device behaviors on the virtual prototype. The ﬁrst
two techniques reduce recording overheads. The last helps discover DMA interface
bugs related to environmental inputs.
We have applied our framework to four Ethernet adapters and their drivers
using their virtual prototypes from QEMU [9]. Our approach has discovered 12
bugs in DMA interface implementations of the devices, their virtual prototypes,
and their drivers. Moreover, the techniques for reducing recording overheads make
our framework applicable to two devices with complicated designs.
In summary, our co-validation of DMA interfaces framework makes following
key contributions:
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1. We present a HW/SW co-validation framework for DMA interface implementations of devices and their drivers using their virtual prototypes.
2. Besides validating the DMA interface implementations, our extended conformance checking further validates interface registers related to the DMA
interface (see details in Section 4.2.3).
3. The three key optimizing techniques make our framework scalable and eﬀective on real industry designs.

4.2
4.2.1

OUR APPROACH
Preliminaries

We ﬁrst brieﬂy review the work ﬂow of DMA-based I/O. A DMA interface is a
piece of shared memory between the device and its driver and can be accessed
by both. The device and the driver exchange data and commands through the
shared memory. A data structure called descriptor is typically used in the DMA
work ﬂow. The work ﬂow of a device interacting with its driver through the DMA
interface is as follows.
1. The driver builds a descriptor d which contains a command c. The driver
puts d into the DMA interface and updates a special interface register Reg of
the device to notify the device that there is a command in the DMA interface.
2. Once Reg is updated, the device reads the descriptor d from the DMA interface and executes the task speciﬁed by c.
3. When the device completes the task, it updates the status of d and writes
d back to the DMA interface. It may also update some relevant interface
registers.
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From this work ﬂow, it can be observed that two aspects of the DMA interface are
validated: (1) the device implementation of the DMA interface that handles the
DMA inputs; (2) the driver implementation that produces DMA inputs.
4.2.2

DMA Interface Validation Framework

As Figure 4.1 shows, our HW/SW co-validation framework is built on the conformance checking work ﬂow. It takes the virtual prototype and a trace ﬁle generated
from the trace recorder, and outputs an inconsistency report and a property failure
report. It consists of two major components as follows.
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Figure 4.1: HW/SW co-validation framework for DMA interfaces

• Conformance checker. Conformance checking over interface registers in Section 3.2 are extended to checking the conformance of both interface registers
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and DMA interface states between the device and its virtual prototype. The
conformance checker detects errors not only in interface registers but also in
DMA interfaces. As the conformance checker simulates the device behaviors
over the virtual prototype and checks their conformance under each driver
request, the virtual prototype essentially shadows the device execution trace
and keeps track of the device state transitions. The device state transitions
exposed by the virtual prototype provides the foundation for property checking.
• Property checker. Property checker is implemented in a same manner as the
property checking presented in Chapter 3. However, instead of verifying the
properties over the device/driver interactions across interface registers, the
property checker veriﬁes the properties related to device/driver interactions
across the DMA interface. It observes the device state transitions through
the virtual prototype and detects if any property violation is possible over
the state transitions.
As our property checker is directly inherited from the property checking in
Chapter 3, we focus on presenting our extended conformance checking infrustracture.
4.2.3

Conformance Checking over DMA Interfaces

This section presents how we extend conformance checking to support the DMA
interface validation. The previous approach to conformance checking (cf. Section 3.2) cannot validate DMA interface implementations.
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Limitations of previous approach
The aim of validating DMA interface implementations is to detect two types of
bugs: those exactly in the DMA interface, which we refer to as DMA interface
bugs; and those in the interface registers whose values have dependencies on the
DMA interface state, which we refer to as DMA register bugs. The previous
approach does not record the DMA interface state at runtime. So it clearly misses
DMA interface bugs. When executing the virtual prototype, this approach models
the DMA interface state with symbolic values. So it also misses DMA register
bugs.
We use an example to illustrate how such a bug escapes. Figure 4.2 shows
how eepro100 processes a DMA driver command. Function pci dma read fetches a
descriptor which is stored in s → cu desc. As labels P1 and P2 indicate, depending
on diﬀerent commands, the device updates the CU state with diﬀerent values and
ﬁres interrupts.
The variable s → cu desc is assigned symbolic values during symbolic execution
of the eepro100 virtual device (VD). As a result, symbolic execution of eepro100
virtual device covers all the three paths in Figure 4.2. We denote the three paths
as p1 , p2 , and p3 . The path p1 follows the code where the branch condition at P1
is true. The path p2 follows the code where the branch condition at P1 is false and
branch condition at P2 is true. The path p3 follows the code where both of the
two branch conditions are false.
Assume that there is a DMA register bug, when the device follows p2 , it fails to
update the cu state with cu suspend. When executing the virtual prototype, the
conformance checker also explores p3 where the cu state is consistent with the cu
state in the device. According to Deﬁnition 3.4, the conformance checker does not
discover this update failure. Instead, the extended approach uses concrete DMA
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... ...
pci_dma_read(cb_address, &s->cu_desc, size);
... ...

P1: if (s->cu_desc & COMMAND_EL) {
// CU becomes idle, fire interrupt
set_cu_state(s, cu_idle);
eepro100_cna_interrupt(s);
}

P2: else if (s->cu_desc & COMMAND_S){
// CU becomes suspended, fire interrupt
set_cu_state(s, cu_suspend);
eepro100_cna_interrupt(s);
}
... ...

Figure 4.2: DMA interface implementations of eepro100 VD
inputs, therefore, only p2 is explored and the cu state is updated to cu suspend,
which is inconsistent with the device cu state. The bug is discovered. The evaluation results show that our extended approach detected several bugs both in the
DMA interface and DMA registers (cf. Section 4.4).
Extended Conformance Checking
Our approach follows a similar work ﬂow as the previous conformance checking,
but makes three key extensions:
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1. Record concrete DMA interface states. In addition to the interface
registers, the trace recorder also records the DMA interface state at runtime.
2. Extend Device State Representation. We deﬁne a DMA interface state
as a set of DMA interface variables with their values. Given V = VI , VN  and
S = SI , SN  deﬁned in Section 3.2.1, we extend the virtual prototype state as
VE = VEI , VN , where VEI = VI , VM , VM represents the virtual prototype
DMA interface state. Similar as VI , the values of VM can be either symbolic
or concrete. We deﬁne the extended silicon device state as SE = SEI , SN ,
SEI = SI , SM , where SM represents the device DMA interface state. The
values of SM are concrete.
3. Report inconsistent DMA interface. The conformance checker checks
the conformance between VEI and SEI in the same manner as Deﬁnition 3.3
and Deﬁnition 3.4. If the virtual prototype and the device do not conform,
the conformance checker outputs inconsistency reports which contains inconsistencies of both interface registers and the DMA interface.
Remarks. The previous approach is sound theoretically. However in practice, it
might have false positives, i.e., false alarms. The virtual prototype might have unbounded loops which make symbolic execution non-terminating. A loop bounding
algorithm is used to set constant bounds for these loops dynamically. This algorithm may reduce possible behaviors of the virtual prototype; therefore, producing
false positives. Our approach faces the same challenge. However, the chance of
false positives is lower than the previous approach in both DMA interface and
interface register conformance checking results. In the previous approach, most of
false positives are caused by bounding two kinds of loops: (1) ones whose loop conditions depend on the environmental inputs; (2) the others whose loop conditions
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depend on the DMA interface values. Our approach does not record environmental
inputs; therefore, we may still get false positives on the ﬁrst kind of loops. However, as we record concrete DMA interface values, our approach eliminates false
positives caused by the second kind.

4.3

TECHNIQUES FOR CHECKING DMA INTERFACES

Our straightforwardly extended conformance checking over DMA interfaces has
two major challenges in scaling to real industry designs. First, capturing DMA
interfaces incurs a large runtime overhead. For example, when we evaluate our
approach on Intel e1000 Ethernet adapter, the computer system hangs and cannot
function normally when the trace recorder captures the DMA interface state. In
Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2, we present two techniques to address this problem.
Second, the conformance checker may still miss DMA bugs related to handling
environmental inputs as it cannot predict when environmental inputs were handled.
We give an example and present our solution in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.1

Record-on-write Policy

The trace recorder records the DMA interface state before each driver request is
issued. However, in the device, the DMA interface is not updated at every driver
request, instead, the DMA interface state remains the same over a signiﬁcant
number of consecutive driver requests. Therefore, it is unnecessary to record the
DMA interface state before each driver request. We develop a technique, the
record-on-write policy, to record the DMA interface only when it is updated.
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Identifying DMA interface updates
The DMA interface is only updated by the device and its driver. There are three
scenarios where the updates occur: (1) the driver issues a command via the DMA
interface; (2) the device outputs to the external environment; (3) the device receives environmental inputs. In fact, the trace recorder only needs to record the
DMA interface under these scenarios. We show how to identify these scenarios
respectively.
• The ﬁrst and second scenarios are all triggered by issuing driver requests.
Since the trace recorder intercepts all driver requests, by analyzing these
driver requests, it can identify the ﬁrst two scenarios.
• For the third scenarios, we use the technique presented later in Section 4.3.3
to identify when the device receives environmental inputs.
Associating DMA interface states with driver requests
Record-on-write leads to a potential problem: for some driver requests, there is
no DMA interface state associated. However, when we replay the device trace on
the virtual prototype, the virtual prototype may still read DMA memory even it
does not update it. Therefore, for these driver requests without the associated
DMA interface state, we need to provide a valid DMA memory to the virtual
prototype. To address this problem, we implement a “copy-on-write” policy while
replaying the device trace. The DMA interface state associated with the current
driver request will be automatically inherited by the next driver request, if there
is no “write” on the DMA interface occurs between these two consecutive driver
requests. When there is a write operation on the DMA interface, the next driver
request uses its own associated DMA interface state.
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4.3.2

Partial Recording of DMA Interface

A DMA interface of a device is not a ﬂatten memory. Instead, it is typically
implemented as a ”ring buﬀer” data structure. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, the device
and the driver keep two indices called “head” and “tail”. When the driver allocates
a unit of memory to the device, it increments “tail”. Similarly, when the device
consumes a unit of memory, it increments “head”. The memory between “head”
and “tail” is considered as valid memory. The device fetches DMA descriptors
only from the memory units between “head” and “tail”.

as a ring buﬀer

4 units

DMA memory

in FIFO

Head (extract)

Tail (insert)

Figure 4.3: Ring buﬀer structure of DMA memory
Since the device only touches the valid memory deﬁned by “head” and “tail”,
when the trace recorder records a DMA memory, it does not need to record the
entire memory. Instead, it only records the valid memory. This way, we further
reduce the overhead incurred by DMA interface state recording.
4.3.3

Environmental Input Prediction

Motivation
As illustrated in Section 3.4.3, upon each driver request, the conformance checker
uses a non-deterministic choice to decide invoking EM or not. In this way, the
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virtual prototype can capture the device behaviors under two possible scenarios:
(1) environmental inputs arrive; (2) no environmental input. However, there is
a potential to miss DMA interface bugs. We present such a concrete example.
When Intel eepro100 receives a packet from its external network, according to its
speciﬁcation, after processing the packet, the device will set its status bit to value
1 in the DMA interface, indicating the completeness of packet reception. Assume
that the status update fails for some reason, as a result, the status bit remains 0
in the DMA interface (see Figure 4.4-(a)). However, this status bit has the same
value as no external input arrivals. In the virtual prototype, as Figure 4.4-(b)
shows, there are two paths including both reception (EM) and non-reception (Not
EM), the conformance checker covers both paths by symbolically executing the
virtual prototype. Therefore, although the DMA interface update fails, it is still
considered valid. This update failure will not be discovered.

Status = 0

Status = 0

EM
Not EM

EM

DMA failure!

Status = 0

(a) Device Trace

Status = 0

Status = 1

(b) Virtual Prototype Traces

Figure 4.4: DMA bugs missed w/o environment input prediction
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Solution
If the conformance checker knows when the device receives environmental inputs
while replaying the device trace, it can just invoke EM instead of trying both
branches. The bugs will not be missed. To realize this feature, we develop a
technique, environmental input prediction. Given a device trace T generated from
the device, environmental input prediction determines when the device receives
environmental inputs. We ﬁrst summarize the typical work ﬂow how a device
receives inputs from the external environment. When environmental inputs arrives,
the device processes these inputs. After the device ﬁnishes processing, it updates
the corresponding status of a descriptor in the DMA interface. Moreover, it ﬁres
an interrupt to notify the driver by updating the interrupt register Rintr with a
speciﬁc value V alintr .
In a device trace T , given two consecutive driver requests Di and Di+1 (0 ≤ i),
there are two device interface states SIi and SIi+1 which are recorded before Di
and Di+1 respectively. If the value of Rintr in SIi is not V alintr and the value of
Rintr in SIi+1 is V alintr , the device receives environmental inputs between Di and
Di+1 . We denote such a pattern of Rintr value change as P . When the conformance
checker replays T on the virtual prototype, if P is detected in Di and Di+1 , the
conformance checker only invokes EM when it processes Di ; otherwise, it does not
invoke EM. In this way, environmental input prediction helps avoid missing certain
bugs in the DMA interface.
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4.4

EVALUATION

4.4.1

Experiment Setup

We have performed our experiments on a workstation with a dual-core Intel Pentium D Processor with 4GB of RAM and Ubuntu Linux OS with 64-bit kernel
version 2.6.38. We applied our framework to four Ethernet adapters and their virtual prototypes, QEMU virtual devices. Information about these devices and their
virtual devices are summarized in Table 4.1. The virtual device size is measured
in Lines of Code (LoC).
Table 4.1: Devices and virtual prototypes for DMA interface validation
Virtual Device
Devices

Basic Description
Size (LoC)

RealTek rtl8139

3544

RealTek 10/100M Ethernet Adapter

Intel eepro100

2178

Intel 10/100M Ethernet Adapter

Intel e1000

2099

Intel Gigabit Ethernet Adapter

Broadcom bcm5751

4519

Broadcom Gigabit Ethernet Adapter

4.4.2

Bug Detection

Our framework has detected 12 new bugs summarized in Table 4.2. There are 2
device bugs, 8 virtual prototype bugs, and 2 driver bugs. Since we conducted our
experiments over the stable products which have been released for many years,
there are only a few device bugs. However, the virtual prototype bugs that we
discovered are all common hardware design ﬂaws. Therefore, our approach has
major potential in discovering bugs in silicon prototypes including FPGAs and
test devices. All the driver bugs are discovered by our property checking. Property
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checking veriﬁed 26 properties in total, of which there are 9 stateless properties
and 17 stateful properties.
Most of these bugs can cause serious problems. Two of the interface register
bugs are related to missing interrupts, which often break down the normal driver
work ﬂow and even cause driver and system crashes. DMA interface bugs cause
corrupted DMA memory, which can lead to driver misbehavior as the driver may
read incorrect status. A driver input with invalid descriptors is potential to incur
device misbehavior.
The results demonstrate that our framework is promising in handling the three
key challenges of HW/SW integration validation presented in Section 1.2. First,
our framework is eﬀective to detect the design ﬂaws in HW/SW interfaces. For
example, the discovered bug of updating the reserved bits in the DMA interface,
can be easily missed without observing HW/SW interface. Second, our framework
can easily identify a HW/SW interface bug as a hardware bug or a software bug.
For example, an invalid driver input often appears like a device bug as the device
usually hangs under the invalid input. By detecting the invalid input through
property checking, the framework clearly identiﬁes this bug as a driver bug. Last
but not the least, detecting DMA register bugs shows that our approach improves
the eﬀectiveness in validating device interface registers.

7

6

5

4

processing DMA data

Fail to simulate the concurrency of

Incorrectly update the DMA interface

out-sync as speciﬁcation requires

Fail to check if DMA data is

the DMA descriptor number is low

Fail to ﬁre required interrupt when

DMA operations have errors

Fail to ﬁre required interrupt when

Update reserved bits in the DMA interface

2

3

Update reserved bits of the DMA interface

Bug Description

1

No.

3

2

1

1

1

2

2

Num.

VP

VP

VP

VP

VP

Device

Driver

Bug Source

DMA interface bug

DMA interface bug

DMA register bug

DMA register bug

DMA register bug

DMA interface bug

Property Violation

Stateless

Bug Types

Table 4.2: Summary of device, virtual prototype, and driver bugs

e1000, bcm5751

eepro100,

bcm5751

bcm5751

e1000

eepro100

e1000, bcm5751

eepro100, e1000

Distribution
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4.4.3

Eﬃciency

In this section, we evaluate the eﬃciency of our recording method with recordon-write policy and partial recording, in terms of time and memory usages in the
runtime recording stage of the conformance checking work ﬂow. The test cases
used in evaluation are described in Table 4.3. All these test cases heavily involve
DMA I/O operations.
Table 4.3: Test cases for evaluating DMA interface validation
Test Cases

Description

Ping

Ping another network interface

Small transfer

Transfer a small ﬁle with size 2.4 MB

Large transfer

Transfer a large ﬁle with size 3.2 GB

The test cases are issued under three conﬁgurations: (1) No Recording (NR)
mode: there is no recording conducted; (2) Recording Everything (RE) mode: the
recording method without the two proposed techniques, which records everything
in the DMA interface; (3) Record-on-write and Partial recording (RP) mode: the
method with record-on-write and partial recording techniques. We set the NR
mode as the baseline and the performance of the NR mode is normalized to 1.
Figure 4.5 shows the ratios of the RE and RP modes comparing to the NR mode.
In Figure 4.5, no data is provided for the RE mode in terms of e1000 and bcm5751
since the RE mode incurs a large overhead and the system hangs. By applying
record-on-write and partial recording techniques in the RP mode, recording DMA
interface states can be successfully and eﬃciently achieved.
The results demonstrate that our two optimizing techniques make recording
DMA interface states scalable to the devices with complicated designs such as e1000
and bcm5751, both Gigabit Ethernet adapters; for the devices such as eepro100 and
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e1000

eepr100

rtl8139

bcm5751

2

Ratios comparing to NR mode

1.8

1.6
1.4
1.2
1

0.8

RE Time

RP Time

RE Memory

RP Memory

Figure 4.5: Time and memory usages of test cases under Recording Everything
(RE) and Record-on-write and Partial recording (RP) modes. The usages with no
recording (NR) are normalized to 1. Figure shows ratios of RE and RP comparing
to NR
rtl8139, both 10/100M Ethernet adapters, record-on-write and partial recording
also noticeably reduce the recording overheads.

4.5

SUMMARY

This chapter has presented a HW/SW co-validation framework to validating the
DMA interface implementations. Our two-staged checking infrastructure helps
detect errors in DMA interface implementations of both a device and its device
driver. We discovered several bugs related to DMA interface implementations from
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devices, their virtual prototypes, and their driver. Our validation framework has
major potential in addressing the key challenges of HW/SW integration validation
which are presented in Section 4.1. First, the framework records and validates the
DMA interface state; thus the errors in the DMA interface are detected eﬀectively.
Second, the framework identiﬁes both the device and driver errors over the DMA
interface thereby it can easily attribute device/driver interface bugs as device or
driver bugs. Finally, our framework only requires minimum manual eﬀorts, which
signiﬁcantly saves validation human eﬀorts.
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Chapter 5
OPTIMIZATIONS FOR CONFORMANCE CHECKING

5.1

MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW

Chapter 3 presents an approach to post-silicon conformance checking of a hardware
device with its virtual prototypes. This approach symbolically executes the virtual
prototypes with the same driver request sequence to the device, and checks if the
interface states of the silicon and virtual prototypes are consistent. However, the
internal state of a device is hard to observe and the external environment inputs
to the device are also hard to capture. This approach uses symbolic execution
to tackle this problem. It models internal states and environment inputs using
variables with symbolic values when simulating the device behaviors on the virtual prototype. This way symbolic execution covers all the possible values of the
internal state and environment inputs.
The approach presented in Chapter 3 has two major limitations.
1. Missing internal bugs. It checks the interface state conformance after
the virtual device processes each driver request. Before processing the next
driver request, it resets the internal states of the virtual device by assigning
them symbolic values. This way, the internal variable values, which have
already been concretized in simulation, are lost. Therefore it may miss certain internal bugs propagating to device interface registers after a few driver
requests later.
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2. Incurring signiﬁcant time usages. Symbolic execution introduces a signiﬁcantly overhead while exploring a large number of paths. This overhead
makes the approach a time-consuming process. In post-silicon conformance
checking, a driver request sequence is often composed of thousands of, even
millions of driver requests, which requires a long time to process. Therefore,
how to reduce time costs is a critical task to scale the conformance checking
approach.
In this section, we present a thorough and eﬃcient approach to address the two
limitations above. Our proposed approach can detect the internal bugs. Rather
than resetting the virtual prototype internal state to symbolic values, our approach keeps the concrete values of the internal state after the virtual prototype
processes each driver request. Moreover, we propose an optimization, adaptive
concretization, to reduce the symbolic execution overheads. We exploit the fact
that most of virtual prototype states conforming to the device state are generated
by an execution path accessing none of or only a few of symbolic values. Adaptive
concretization eliminates unnecessary symbolic values to prune unnecessary paths
explored by symbolic execution.
We have evaluated the approach on three Ethernet adapters and their virtual
prototypes from QEMU virtual machine [9]. We discovered 25 inconsistencies,
behind which there are 25 device bugs including both interface and internal bugs
in either the devices or their virtual devices. Furthermore, the time usages have
been reduced by an order of magnitude.
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5.2

THOROUGH CONFORMANCE CHECKING

5.2.1

Problem and Motivation

As Algorithm 3.1 describes, the native approach synchronizes the virtual prototype
state to the device state before processing each drive request (line 4). As the
internal state variables of a device are modeled as symbolic values without any
constraints, this synchronization causes the internal state variables with concrete
values in the virtual device to lose their values.
We use an example to illustrate how the native approach misses internal bugs.
This example is an device internal error of an Ethernet adapter as follows.
In 100 Mb/s link mode, internal clocks are slower, and access of an internal
register can lead to timeout. An unknown value is returned on the PCI Express
(PCIe) interface [28].
This bug happens when the internal register value propagates to the interface
register (PCIe interface) upon a driver request. We give a complete scenario as
follows. Let the buggy internal register be RegN , assume that there is a driver
sequence D0 , ..., Di , ..., Dj , ..., Dn (0 ≤ i < j ≤ n), where Di updates RegN to a
concrete value val and Dj reads RegN and gets a value val from an interface
register RegI which the value of RegN propagates to. Essentially, the above error
occurs while val of RegN propagates to RegI , val is not equal to val. In the
native approach, after the virtual prototype processes Di and the virtual prototype
conforms to the device, a new virtual prototype state Vi+1 is created for processing
Di+1 and RegN in Vi+1 is reset to a symbolic value α instead of val. Therefore, upon
the driver request Dj , the virtual prototype returns α to RegI . In the device, the
value is val . The native approach returns true as symbolic value α can cover val .
However, if the virtual prototype keeps the internal value val, this inconsistency
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can be detected.
5.2.2

Thorough Conformance Checking Approach

We propose an approach to deal with the problem in Section 5.2.1. This approach
has the same workﬂow with the native approach except that it avoids synchronizing
the virtual prototype state to the device state in each iteration. Algorithm 5.1
illustrates the workﬂow.
Algorithm 5.1 thorough replay trace(T , F )
1: T  ← convert trace(T )
2:

/*Initialize VD state V0 to be SD state S0 */

3:

V 0 ← S0

4:

/* Take Sk , Dk  from T  */

5:

for k : 0 → n do

6:

G ← sym exec(F, Vk , Dk )

7:

H ← conf ormance check(G, Sk+1 )

8:

if H == ∅ then

9:

report incon()

10:
11:
12:
13:
14:

Vk+1 ← Sk+1
else
Vk+1 ← construct next state(H)
end if
end for

In the new workﬂow, same as the native approach, function conf ormance check
generates a set of virtual device states H = {hi | hi = ∅, 0 ≤ i ≤ m} where hi =
set(gj ) ∩ set(Sk+1 ), 0 ≤ j ≤ n. If H is an empty set, the virtual and devices do not
conform, we report this inconsistency and synchronize the next virtual device state
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Vk+1 to the device state Sk+1 . Otherwise, function construct next state constructs
m

hi . As Deﬁnition 3.1 illustrates, Vk+1 can be represented as a
Vk+1 as Vk+1 =
i=0

pair VIk+1 , VNk+1  and ∀hi ∈ H, hi = hiI , hiN , 0 ≤ i ≤ m. The variables in the
virtual prototype state can be denoted as var and its value can be denoted as
V al(var). Algorithm 5.2 shows how to compute the Vk+1 .
Algorithm 5.2 construct next state(H)
1: /*Constructing interface state.*/
2:

VIk+1 ← h0I

3:

/*Constructing Internal State.*/

4:

for each varj of VNk+1 do
m

5:
V al(varj )Vk+1 ←
V al(varj )hi
i=0

6:

end for

7:

return Vk+1

Notes. This approach takes the union of the conforming states, thereby all the
possibilities of virtual prototype internal states are reserved. Once an internal bug
occurs and propagates to an interface register in either the virtual or silicon device,
our approach reports an inconsistency when all the possible states of the virtual
prototype do not conform to the device.

5.3
5.3.1

ADAPTIVE CONCRETIZATION
Preliminaries

Deﬁnition 5.1 (Virtual Prototype Path). A virtual prototype path is a sequence
of branch conditions, denoted as π = c0 , c1 , ..., cn−1 , cn , where ci (0 ≤ i ≤ n) is
a branch condition, a Boolean expression over device state variables and external
environment inputs. We refer to virtual prototype path as path for simplicity.
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Deﬁnition 5.2 (Conforming Path). Given a virtual prototype state Vk and its
next virtual prototype state sets G = {gi | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} (cf. Section 5.2), ∀gi ∈ G,
there exists a virtual prototype path π, Vk transitions to gi following π, denoted as
π

Vk ⇒ gi . Vk is the previous state of π and gi is the next state of π. Moreover, if gi
is a conforming state, we deﬁne π as a conforming path.
5.3.2

Our Approach

Motivation. The conformance checking approach assigns symbolic values to the
internal state variables and the external environment inputs. These variables with
symbolic values account for a signiﬁcant overhead as symbolic execution explores
an enormous number of paths due to symbolic values. An intuitive idea is to assign
concrete values to these variables instead of symbolic ones. We observed that a
conforming path usually accesses none of, or only a small number of variables with
symbolic values. In other words, variables with symbolic values do not aﬀect the
conformance checking results most of time. Therefore, we can adaptively concretize
these symbolic variables to reduce symbolic execution overhead.
We present an optimization, adaptive concretization, to optimize the conformance checking approach. Figure 5.1 shows the workﬂow. Adaptive concretization
is a two-round of conformance checking. In the ﬁrst round, we concretize (1) virtual prototype internal variables and (2) external environment inputs, which all
have symbolic values originally. Then we check the conformance following the same
workﬂow of the conformance checking approach. We deﬁne this round as concrete
mode. However, as the concrete values we assigned to the variables might not be
the right values, the concrete mode may produce false alarms, i.e., false positives.
To eliminate these false positives, we conduct a second around using the original
virtual prototype where the internal state and external inputs all have symbolic
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values. This round veriﬁes the inconsistencies discovered in the concrete mode.
We deﬁne such a round as reﬁnement mode.
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Figure 5.1: Workﬂow of adaptive concretization
Concrete Mode. The conformance checking algorithm of the concrete mode is
shown in Algorithm 5.3. It takes a device trace T and a virtual prototype F as its
inputs.
Algorithm 5.3 follows the workﬂow of Algorithm 3.1 except three modiﬁcations: (1) function convert to conrete trace is applied instead of convert trace to
concretize device states in T ; (2) function concretize device concretizes the virtual prototype F ; (3) when an inconsistency is discovered, the workﬂow enters the
reﬁnement mode rather than directly reporting an inconsistency.
Given T = SI0 , D0 , SI1 , D1 , ..., SIn , Dn , function convert to conrete trace
converts T to T  = S0 , D0 , S1 , D1 , ..., Sn , Dn , where Sk = SIk , SNk (0 ≤ k ≤
n) derived from SIk . Instead of assigning symbolic values to internal state variables
of SNk , function convert to conrete trace assigns value zero to variables of SNk .
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Algorithm 5.3 concrete mode(T , F )
1: T  ← convert to conrete trace(T )
2:

F  ← concretize device(F )

3:

/*Initialize VP state V0 to be device state S0 */

4:

V 0 ← S0

5:

/* Take Sk , Dk  from T  */

6:

for k : 0 → n do

7:

G ← sym exec(F  , Vk , Dk )

8:

H ← conf ormance check(G, Sk+1 )

9:

if H == ∅ then

10:
11:
12:
13:
14:

Vk+1 ← ref inement mode(F, Vk , Sk+1 , Dk )
else
Vk+1 ← construct next state(H)
end if
end for

Moreover, in function concretize device, external environment inputs to the virtual
prototype F are also concretized to zeros. As the values of some environment
input variables cannot be zero, for example, the value for modeling the received
packet size cannot be zero, function concretize device randomly picks up non-zero
concrete values in their valid ranges.
The reason we use zero rather than other concrete values for concretization is
because most of the internal state variables have zero as their initial values. By
setting zero, we can largely avoid introducing false positives in the concrete mode.
The zero value we use to concretize symbolic values should be treated as a special
concrete value. We denote such a value as 0sym , indicating this zero is concretized
from a symbolic value and will be recovered to the symbolic value in the reﬁnement
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mode. As discussed above, some environmental variables are concretized into nonzero values. For these variables, we denote their random non-zero values as rsym
5.3.3

Reﬁnement Mode

The reﬁnement mode takes the virtual prototype F , a virtual prototype state Vk ,
a device state Sk+1 , and a driver request Dk as its inputs. It has the same workﬂow as presented in Algorithm 3.1. Additionally, it has two conversion functions
Con2Sym and Sym2Con. Function Con2Sym is invoked immediately when the
workﬂow enters the reﬁnement mode. It replaces 0sym and rsym of virtual prototype variables with symbolic values. Function Sym2Con is invoked in the end of
reﬁnement mode. It converts the next state Vk+1 generated in the reﬁnement mode
from a symbolic state to a concrete state where symbolic values of internal state
variables are concretized to 0sym and rsym again. In this way, Vk+1 can be used in
the concrete mode. By recovering 0sym and rsym to symbolic values, the reﬁnement
mode re-simulates the virtual prototype under the driver request leading to the
inconsistency in concrete mode. The inconsistency conﬁrmed in the reﬁnement
mode are reported as a real inconsistency.

5.4

EVALUATION

5.4.1

Experiment Setup

All experiments were conducted on a workstation with a dual-core Intel Pentium D
Processor at 3.20 GHz and 4GB of RAM, running Linux with kernel version 2.6.35.
We evaluated three widely used network adapters and their QEMU virtual devices
as virtual prototypes. Information of these devices and their virtual devices are
summarized in Table 5.1. The virtual device size is measured in Lines of Code
(LOC).
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Table 5.1: Devices and virtual prototypes for adaptive concretization
Virtual Device
Devices

Basic Description
Size (LOC)

Intel e1000

2099

Intel Gigabit Ethernet Adapter

Broadcom bcm5751

4519

Broadcom Gigabit Ethernet Adapter

Intel eepro100

2178

Intel Megabit Ethernet Adapter

Table 5.2: Summary of virtual prototype bugs
No.

Bug Description

Num.

Distribution

1

Internal read-only register is updated

1

bcm5751

2

Reserved bits of internal registers are updated

1

bcm5751

5.4.2

Bug Detection

In this section, we demonstrate that (1) our new approach can detect all the
previous bugs discovered by the native approach; (2) our approach detects several
internal bugs which cannot be discovered by the native approach.
To demonstrate that our optimized approach does not reduce the capacity
comparing to the native approach, we preform the test cases triggering the previous
inconsistencies between devices and virtual prototypes. The results shows that our
approach detects all the previous bugs.
One important improvement of our approach is to detect internal bugs. In the
experiment, the approach detects 2 internal bugs in virtual prototypes. All these
internal bugs cannot be caught by the native approach. Figure 5.2 shows the details
of these bugs. The experiment does not ﬁnd any device internal bugs. The reason
is that the devices are stable products which have gone through extensive testing
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and bug-ﬁxing procedures. However, these virtual prototype bugs are still possible
to show up in silicon prototypes at the early stage of hardware development, since
these bugs are common violations of hardware designs. We believe that if this
approach is conducted at the post-silicon testing stage before devices are released,
it can also discover the device internal bugs as well.
Table 5.3: Test cases for evaluating adaptive concretization
Test Cases

Description

Reset Network Interface Bring down and then bring up the network interface

5.4.3

Ping

Ping another network interface

Transfer ﬁles

Copy large ﬁles with total size 3.2 GB

NIC test-suite

A set of typical test cases on NIC

Eﬃciency

We evaluate the eﬃciency of our approach, in terms of time usages, memory usages,
and false positives in the concrete mode. We issue four kinds of test cases to the
network adapters to collect device traces. These test cases are all common usages
of network adapters as shown in Table 5.3. “NIC test-suite” contains a family of
typical test cases on network interface controllers (NIC), which manipulates a NIC
in diﬀerent ways, e.g., sending UDP packets and setting MTU size.

Time usages
We calculate the average time usages to process 100 driver requests in each test
cases. Table 5.4 summarizes the results. The time have been reduced an order
of magnitude by using the optimized approach. The time usages are reduced
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Table 5.4: Time and memory usages in adaptive concretization

Devices

e1000

bcm5751

eepro100

Time Usage (sec)

Memory Usage (MB)

Test Cases

Native

Optimized

Native

Optimized

Reset NIC

31.28

1.83

233.41

225.26

Ping

366.28

45.10

336.21

330.24

Transfer ﬁles

415.05

48.29

336.63

331.57

NIC test-suite

351.13

18.36

288.79

288.33

Reset NIC

26.31

0.88

169.01

168.32

Ping

305.11

42.05

284.25

279.47

Transfer ﬁles

294.84

48.23

273.23

261.69

NIC test-suite

261.77

23.79

225.95

225.93

Reset NIC

28.79

0.61

251.62

243.81

Ping

236.51

16.62

261.31

259.63

Transfer ﬁles

210.44

16.70

262.96

258.99

NIC test-suite

215.57

8.63

261.34

258.38

less in the test cases “Ping” and “Transfer ﬁles” than the other two test cases.
The reason is that these two test cases involve receiving packets. The test case
involving receiving packets has more false positives introduced in the concrete
mode, as the conforming paths usually access many symbolic variables representing
the environmental inputs. Therefore, in these two test cases, the approach often
requires the reﬁnement mode and the time usages are increased. (See Section 5.4.4
for the number of false positives in the concrete mode under each test cases).
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Memory usages
We evaluate the memory usages in the same way as evaluating time usages. As
Table 5.4 shows, the results suggest that our optimized approach has almost same
memory usages with the native approach. Consider that the memory usages are
not too high, the memory resource costs are acceptable.
5.4.4

False Positives of Concrete Mode

The eﬀectiveness of adaptive concretization heavily depends on the number of
false positives of the concrete mode. To explain the eﬀectiveness of our optimized
approach better, we record the number of the false positives. In this experiment,
we collect the numbers of inconsistencies produced by the concrete mode and
the reﬁnement mode, denoted as α and β respectively. As a result, the false
positives can be computed as α minuses β. Figure 5.2 shows the results. All
the inconsistencies are counted while our optimized approach processes 100 driver
requests.
As Figure 5.2 shows, our approach does not introduce too many false positives
in the concrete mode. The highest case is 3 false positives out of 100 driver requests.
This demonstrates adaptive concretization is eﬃcient. In addition, we ﬁnd that
test cases involving receiving packets have more false positives.

5.5

RELATED WORK

Many research have been done for reducing symbolic execution overheads. A major
eﬀort is to avoid path explosions by pruning redundant paths. RWSet [10] and
path subsumption [2] employ a similar heuristic whereas a path which is identical
to the one previously explored can be safely pruned. Kuznetsov et al. [35] propose
a method of automatically merging states to reduce the number of paths explored
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Figure 5.2: Numbers of inconsistencies under test cases
in symbolic execution. Several other approaches [21, 53, 56] leverage the beneﬁts of
concolic execution to partially concretize the target programs thereby the number
of explored paths is decreased.

5.6

SUMMARY

In this section, we have presented the optimization approach to thoroughly and
eﬃciently checking the virtual prototype and device conformance. By keeping
virtual prototype internal state, the conformance checking is extended to detection
of internal bugs. While employing adaptive concretization, symbolic execution
time usages are reduced signiﬁcantly. These optimizations make the conformance
checking eﬃcient and scalable to the hardware devices with complicated designs.
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Chapter 6
HW/SW CO-MONITORING

6.1

MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW

6.1.1

Motivation

We have presented our HW/SW co-validation framework for post-silicon stage in
previous chapters. However, post-silicon validation is not suﬃcient: when the system is released, HW/SW interfaces are still vulnerable even after many iterations
of testing and validation. In fact, assuring HW/SW interface reliability and security faces diﬀerent challenges comparing to the post-silicon stage. There are three
major challenges: (1) hardware transient errors are abundant in our daily life; (2)
device drivers can be easily hijacked to exploit HW/SW interface vulnerabilities,
sometimes, even the driver itself is malicious. (3) Recently hardware trojans are
more and more prevalent, where the malicious attacks can be easily launched to
target on HW/SW interfaces. Therefore, it is highly desired to develop a systematic approach which can eﬀectively monitor HW/SW interfaces to detection of
defects and malicious attacks across HW/SW interfaces.
Our post-silicon HW/SW co-validation is conducted oﬀ-line. At the deployment
stage, it is not realistic to deploy the oﬀ-line validation framework. Therefore, we
need to develop an on-line monitoring framework to conduct conformance and
property checking. In this section, we present our on-line monitoring approach,
HW/SW co-monitoring, which simultaneously monitors a hardware device and its
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driver at runtime and reports device and driver errors.
6.1.2

Our Approach

We present HW/SW co-monitoring, a novel approach to conducting HW/SW coveriﬁcation at runtime. As shown in Figure 6.1, the foundation of this approach
is a formal device model (FDM), a transaction-level, executable model which captures the device behaviors. This approach is based on the co-execution of the
FDM and device where the FDM shadows the device execution. Based on the coexecution, our approach entails three major techniques to realize runtime HW/SW
co-veriﬁcation:
• Runtime concolic execution of the FDM and driver where the driver is running concretely while the FDM is executed symbolically;
• Runtime detection of divergence between the device and FDM, namely device
checking;
• Runtime veriﬁcation of system-level properties against the device and driver
indirectly on the FDM and driver.
OS
Device Driver

HW/SW
Interface

Events

CPC

Properties+
Formal Device
Models (FDM)

Driver
Specification
Model
Generation
Interface
Specification

Hardware Device
Device
Specification

Figure 6.1: HW/SW co-monitoring of device and driver
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In the runtime concolic execution, symbolic execution of the FDM helps overcome a critical challenge in runtime HW/SW co-veriﬁcation. Ideally, runtime coveriﬁcation can be done by directly observing the device states, the driver states
and their interactions. However, in practice, observing the device internal states
is diﬃcult. Therefore, we utilize the FDM as a reference model of the device and
we symbolically execute the FDM under the same driver requests, while the device
internal states are modeled as symbolic values in the FDM. As a result, symbolic
execution of the FDM explores all possible device internal behaviors at runtime.
We implement device checking by examining whether the device behaviors conform to the FDM. Detecting the nonconformance between the FDM and device
serves two purposes: (1) Device bugs or unintended behaviors can be discovered;
(2) If no nonconformance detected, properties holding on the FDM/driver interface
also hold on the device/driver interface. Essentially, co-monitoring conducts runtime veriﬁcation over the device and the driver indirectly through the FDM/driver
co-veriﬁcation.
We carry out the runtime co-veriﬁcation over the FDM and the driver by
building upon previous work on automata-theoretic approach to HW/SW coveriﬁcation [40]. The previous approach veriﬁes HW/SW interface properties over
the FDM and the driver statically. The FDM and the driver are modeled as a
Büchi Automaton (BA) and a Labeled Pushdown System (LPDS) respectively
while their combinations are modeled as a Büchi Pushdown System (BPDS). To
verify system properties, reachability analysis is carried out over the BPDS by
exploring the BPDS state space and the FDM and the driver are executed symbolically. Our approach also models the FDM/driver composition as a BPDS and
explores the BPDS state space to verify system properties. However, our runtime co-veriﬁcation explores the BPDS state space in a concolic way: the driver is
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executed concretely while the FDM is explored symbolically.
This concolic exploration is the key to adapting static co-veriﬁcation to runtime
monitoring. The concolic exploration of BPDS brings three beneﬁts: (1) symbolic
execution helps cover possible device behaviors at runtime; (2) concrete execution
of the driver largely constrains the state space, avoiding state space explosions; (3)
concrete execution eliminates the need for modeling the environment for exercising
the driver.
HW/SW co-monitoring essentially provides a uniﬁed solution for detecting and
analyzing HW/SW interface defects. By eﬃciently monitoring the device, the
driver, and their interface, it can discover most types of defects in HW/SW interfaces, ranging from hardware transient errors to driver bugs to malicious exploits.
Moreover, by monitoring the device as well as the driver, HW/SW co-monitoring
can easily identify a HW/SW interface defect as a hardware bug or a software bug.
We evaluated our approach on four Ethernet adapters and their Linux drivers.
We simulated malicious exploits from both hardware and software across HW/SW
interfaces. Our approach can successfully detect these injected malicious exploits.
Moreover it detected several real bugs and security vulnerabilities. By analyzing
these bugs, we showed that they either cause serious system failures or bring potential security issues. The results demonstrate that hardware/software co-monitoring
has major potential in improving system reliability and security.
6.1.3

Contributions

HW/SW co-monitoring makes four major contributions to improving system reliability and security.
• It realizes runtime HW/SW co-veriﬁcation by leveraging concolic execution,
which detects errors and unintended behaviors in both devices and drivers.
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• It helps narrow down an error from a HW/SW composition into a hardware
violation of speciﬁcation, a software violation of speciﬁcation, or an interface
error.
• It provides a mechanism for early detection of malicious exploits of HW/SW
interface vulnerabilities, thereby facilitating mechanisms for protection before impact from the exploits aﬀects the rest of the system.
• It facilitates detection of and protection against transient hardware failures.
Such failures will be prevented from propagating deep into the system and
devices and drivers will be brought back to normal modes.

6.2
6.2.1

HW/SW CO-MONITORING FRAMEWORK
Overview

This section gives an overview of our approach. As Figure 6.2 shows, the framework of HW/SW co-monitoring consists of three major components: a wrapper
driver, a symbolic execution environment (SEE), and a property monitor (PM).
The wrapper driver is used to capture the device state, the driver state, and the
interactions between the device and the driver. The SEE symbolically executes
the FDM by taking the driver request sequence as inputs, which realizes the coexecution with the device. Based on the co-execution, the SEE conducts device
checking to ensure that the FDM shadows the device execution. The PM enforces
a set of system properties which specify how the device and driver interact with
each other. The PM carries out runtime HW/SW co-veriﬁcation, which we call
property checking. Basic functionalities of device checking and property checking
are described as follows.

88

OS
Driver Events

Driver
Wrapper Driver

Property Monitor
FDM States

Driver Events

Device States

Symoblic Execution
Environment(SEE)
Formal Device
Model

Device

Figure 6.2: HW/SW co-monitoring framework
• Device Checking. The goal of device checking is to detect the divergence
between the FDM and the device. We leverage a previous technique, conformance checking [38], which checks if the device behaviors conform to the
FDM with symbolic execution. Through device checking, the device errors
can be detected and if no divergence between the device and FDM, the FDM
can be used as a model of the device for property checking.
• Property checking. PM carries out property checking based on device checking. It veriﬁes system properties over the device and driver, indirectly over
the composition of the FDM and driver. By property checking, invalid driver
inputs or incorrect device interface states during device/driver interaction can
be discovered.
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6.2.2

Deﬁnitions

Based on the notion of conformance checking in previous work [38], we propose
the deﬁnition of conformance between the FDM and the device. According to [38],
a hardware device state is composited by a set of interface state variables denoted
as RI and a set of internal state variables denoted as RN . We model a FDM state
in the same way as the device state. A FDM state is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 6.1. A FDM state is denoted as V = VI , VN  where VI is the device
interface state, i.e., the assignments to variables in RI and VN is the device internal
state, i.e., the assignments to variables in RN .
A device state is deﬁned as follows. Since at runtime the device internal state
cannot be observed, we assign symbolic values to the device internal state variables.
Deﬁnition 6.2. A device state is denoted as S = SI , SN  where SI is the
assignments to variables in RI and SN is the symbolic assignments to variables in
RN .
A FDM state or a device state can be viewed as a symbolic state if some of
whose state variables values are symbolic. As Section 2.3 illustrates, a FDM can
be modeled as a BA, B = (Σ, Q, δ, q0 , F ). In this way, a FDM state V can be
modeled as a set of BA states V = {vi | vi ∈ Q, i>0}. Moreover, as a device state
shares the same format as the FDM state. A device state S can be also modeled as
a set of BA states. The conformance of a device state and a FDM state is deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (State Conformance). A device state S conforms to a FDM state
V if S ∩ V = ∅.
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As both V and S can be treated as a set of BA states, V represents all the
possible BA states that the FDM may have and S represents all the possible BA
states that the device may have. The condition S ∩ V = ∅ indicates that the FDM
state and the device state cannot be the same, i.e., the device and FDM executions
diverge at runtime.
6.2.3

Wrapper Driver

The wrapper driver captures: (1) the driver request issued to the device; (2) the
device interface state before the driver request issued. Once a new driver request
is issued, the wrapper driver sends a state-request pair to SEE. We denote such
a state-request pair as SI , α where SI is the device interface state and α is the
current driver request.
Ideally, to verify HW/SW interfaces, the wrapper driver needs to capture the
device state, the driver state, and the driver requests issued to the device. In our
current implementation, property checking only checks the properties related to
the driver requests and the device states, but not to the driver states. Therefore,
the wrapper driver does not capture the driver states. For future work, we will
extend our wrapper driver to capture the driver states.
Selective Capturing
The wrapper driver captures the device interface state: the device registers and
their values. However, a peripheral device often has a large range of registers.
Capturing all the registers heavily degrades the system performance. Previous
work [38] proposes selective capturing: instead of all registers, only a small set
of registers, important to device functionalities, are captured. For example, the
reserved registers are typically not captured. Our wrapper driver adopts selective
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capturing as our basic capturing method.
Sampling Reserved Registers
Selective capturing helps capture the registers important to the device functionalities. However, directly adopting this method does not fully meet our requirements
for monitoring the device. In HW/SW co-monitoring, our framework monitors
not only whether the deﬁned behaviors are correct but also whether there are any
undeﬁned or abnormal behaviors. For example, the changes in reserved register
values indicate potential malicious behaviors in the device interface. Reserved registers can be used to place the software program for code injection (see a concrete
example in Section 6.3.1). As a result, the wrapper driver should capture reserved
registers as well.
However capturing reserved registers faces a similar problem: the range of
reserved registers is often large. To address this problem, we develop a method,
namely reserved register sampling. We capture one reserved register every few
registers. Our sample method works for the following reasons: (1) for large injected
code, sampling can easily hit part of it; (2) for small injected code, we increase the
chance of detection by sliding the sample windows every time we capture.
6.2.4

Device Checking

SEE conducts runtime device checking. It symbolically executes the FDM while
continuously taking the state-request pairs from the wrapper driver. Algorithm 6.1
presents the work ﬂow of runtime device checking. It takes a FDM M as inputs.
Our device checking work ﬂow has the following steps:
1. SEE gets the ﬁrst request-state pair and intiaize FDM state V with the device
interface state SI ;
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2. SEE symbolically executes the FDM with the driver request α and the FDM
state V ;
3. SEE checks the conformance between the set of possible FDM next states G
and the device next state S  ;
4. If the device conforms to the FDM, we construct the next FDM state and
assign it to V , go to step 2. Otherwise, we report a device error.
The functions in Algorithm 6.1 are described as follows.
1. Receiving Requests. Function receive state request() is invoked to wait for
and receive a state-request pair SI , α from the wrapper driver.
2. Device State Construction. Given a device interface state SI , based on Definition 6.2, construct device state constructs a device state S = SI , SN 
where state variables in SN are assigned symbolic values.
3. Symbolic Execution. Function sym exec symbolically executes the FDM M
and generates a set of FDM states, which is denoted as G.
4. Conformance Checking. As discussed above, symbolic execution of a FDM
may produce a set of FDM states G = {gi | 0 ≤ i ≤ n}. The next
device state received from the wrapper driver is denoted as S  . Function
conf ormance check checks the conformance between the device and FDM.
We deﬁne their conformance based on G and S  in Deﬁnition 6.4. Function
conf ormance check returns a set of the FDM states conforming to the device
state, denoted as H = {hi | 0 ≤ i ≤ m}.
5. Device Error Report. If the set H is empty, no conforming FDM state is
produced, i.e., the FDM does not conform to the device at driver request α,
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function report device error is invoked to record the device error, including
the FDM execution trace, the driver request, and the state variables of the
device, which are not equal to the state variables of the FDM.
6. Next State Construction.

If H is not empty, the FDM and the device

conform to each other at α. Based on H = {hi | 0 ≤ i ≤ m}, function construct next State constructs the next FDM state V  as follows:
m

V  = (set(hi ) ∩ set(S  )).
i=1

Deﬁnition 6.4 (Device Conformance). Given the set of FDM states G={gi | 0 ≤
i ≤ n} and the device state S  , the device conforms to the FDM at α if ∃gi ∈ G
where 0 ≤ i ≤ n, S  ∩ gi = ∅.
6.2.5

Property Checking

Property monitor veriﬁes the enforced system properties over the BPDS representing the driver and the FDM. Device checking provides the foundation of property
checking in two aspects. First, conformance checking between the FDM and device ensures that the FDM shadows the device execution trace. As a result, the
property holding on the FDM/driver interface also holds on the device/driver interface. Second, the symbolic execution of the FDM with the concrete driver
execution veriﬁes the enforced system properties.
Runtime Veriﬁcation of System Properties
Property checking conducts reachability analysis over the BPDS by leveraging our
concolic exploration of the FDM and the driver. To detect if a property is violated,
we implement a special method for runtime veriﬁcation. In the static HW/SW coveriﬁcation, a property ψ is violated as long as there is a BPDS path where ¬ψ is
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reachable. However, this method cannot be used in our runtime veriﬁcation since
we cannot observe the device internal states and we model possible device internal
states with symbolic variables. From the existence of such a BPDS path, it is
insuﬃcient to conclude it is a property violation. Therefore, we develop a method
for property violation detection that is more conservative: only if the property is
violated under all possible situations, we report a property violation.
As mentioned in Section 6.2.4, the symbolic execution of the FDM with the
concrete driver execution explores the BPDS state space. Under a single driver
request α, the execution of the FDM and the driver explores a set of BPDS paths,
denoted as P. Based on this notion, Deﬁnition 6.5 gives the condition where the
property is violated.
Deﬁnition 6.5 (Property violations). Given a property ψ, a set of BPDS paths
P = {pi | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} explored under a driver request α, ψ is violated under α if
∀pi ∈ P , ¬ψ is reachable on pi .
The set P represents all possible device and behaviors under the current driver
request α. Only if all of these possible behaviors lead to the violation of the
property ψ, the PM can ensure there is an invalid driver request triggering the
violation.
Implementation of Property Checking
Since the PM only maintains a relatively small set of properties, we integrate
the PM into the SEE. This way, we leverage the FDM and driver executions to
explore the BPDS state space and the FDM can be directly used as a validation
vehicle. For property checking, we ﬁrst specify the properties in assertions and
then instrument the FDM with the assertions. While the device checker simulates
the device behaviors with the FDM, the PM detects if any assertions fail during

95
the simulation. Currently we instrument the assertions manually. In future, we
will develop a method that allows the users to specify assertions in a certain format
and automatically instruments the assertions.
We use a system property from EEPRO100 as an example to show how we
specify an assertion and instrument the assertion into the FDM. The property
speciﬁed in EEPRO100 speciﬁcation [27] is as follows. As Figure 6.3 shows, a
special API function comon assert is used to instrument the property.
Property: If the device Command Unit (CU) is not in SUSPENDED status, the
driver cannot send RESUME to the device.
static void eepro100_cu_command(EEPRO100State* s,
uint8_t val)
{
// Assertion to enforce the example property
if (s->cu_state != CU_STATE_SUSPENDED)
comon_assert(val != CU_CMD_RESUME);
......
}

Figure 6.3: Assertions instrumented in EEPRO100 FDM
Note. The system properties that the PM can verify depend on the device interface state, the driver requests, and the driver state. However, as mentioned in
Section 6.2.3, in our current implementation, the PM only veriﬁes the properties
involving the driver request and device interface state. We will extend the PM to
verify properties related to driver states in future work.
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6.3

APPLICATIONS IN SECURITY

As mentioned in Section 6.1.2, our approach can be used in not only detecting
device or driver bugs but also catching malicious exploits of HW/SW interface
vulnerabilities. In this section, we elaborate on the types of malicious behaviors
across HW/SW interfaces. Furthermore, for each category of malicious attacks,
we present how our HW/SW co-monitoring framework detects these attacks.
6.3.1

Threat Model

Software Attack
Hardware interfaces exposed to software are vulnerable. These vulnerabilities can
be exploited by malicious software. In device/driver interfaces, device speciﬁcations usually specify system rules which the driver should follow. As a consequent,
if the driver issues invalid commands which do not follow the rules, the device can
be easily driven to unresponsive state. For example, in Intel eepro100 Ethernet,
if the device driver issues a command to activate the device when the device is
already at the “active” state, the device will be driven to an unresponsive state.
Malicious software can issue invalid commands to crash or hang the device.
while (ioread16(ioaddr + Wn7_MasterStatus))
& 0x8000)
;

Figure 6.4: Excerpts from 3c59x driver.
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Hardware Attack
Software interface to hardware is vulnerable as well. Improper handling of hardware inputs can easily cause the driver hang or even the system crash. Figure 6.4
shows an example which is illustrated by [30]. Function “ioread” reads a data
from the device. If the value read from the device is not proper. The driver will
loop forever. This example shows that the driver vulnerabilities can be exploited
by malicious hardware. The malicious hardware can feed incorrect inputs to the
driver which might crash or hang the driver.
Except the malicious hardware inputs to the driver, there are other attacks
which can be done by hardware especially by hardware trojans. We list some of
them as follows.
• Denial of Services (DoS). Besides issuing invalid inputs to the driver, hardware trojans can make the device unresponsive to any incoming data and
commands.
• Stealing user secretes. In many systems, devices are used to encrypt password
and data. Hardware trojans residing in devices can observe the encryption
key. Moreover, they can reuse available hardware resources to send over the
key through the network.
• Code injection. Hardware trojans can also have potential to injected code
into the runtime system, i.e., the code injected by the hardware trojan is
executed in the OS kernel. For example, DMA attack is a way to access the
physical memory via DMA. Several examples have demonstrated that DMA
attacks can inject code into the OS kernels. Furthermore, modern peripheral
devices usually have a large piece of Memory-Mapped I/O (MMIO) registers
which can be accessed by CPU as accessing the normal physical memory.
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Moreover, a signiﬁcant portion of MMIO registers is reserved which should
be not used by either software or hardware. Therefore, hardware trojans can
easilly place the injected code into the MMIO interface without aﬀecting the
normal system logic. We have implemented a DMA attack which gains the
root privilege of the OS through code injection, described as follows.
User-level Program

Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)
Div. by zero

0x0

0xeeffeeff

...

..

...

...

...

...

System Calll

0x80
80

0xbbffeeff
0xffffeebb

...

.....

...

Interrupt0

0x128
128

0xbbffeeee

...

.....

...

DMA Memoryy

System_call:
CFI_STARTPROC simple
CFI_SIGNAL_FRAME
… ...
/*CFI_REGISTER rflags,r11*/
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
… ...

Overwrite IDT
entry with DMA

System Memory (RAM)

OS

Hardware
MMIO Registers

Injected Code

Reserved

DMA
Module
e

Internal
Modules
Hardware
are
n
Trojan

Ethernet Controller

Figure 6.5: Work ﬂow of a hardware trojan attacking OS through hooking system
calls

Example. Figure 6.5 shows the work ﬂow of this attacking scenario. In
this example, a hardware trojan in an Ethernet controller takes over the
OS by injecting code through DMA attacks. It has two steps: (1) Placing
the code to be executed in MMIO reserved registers; (2) Hooking system
calls by modifying the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) through DMA. As
a result, when each system call is executed, the injected code is executed
ﬁrst. Moreover, injected code is executed in the OS kernel space which has
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root privilege. Essentially the injected can do everything. In this example,
it opens the SSH port and create an account with “sudo” privilege.
6.3.2

Detecting Malicious Attacks

Our HW/SW co-monitoring infrastructure can detect the HW/SW malicious behaviors by monitoring hardware interfaces and software inputs to hardware. We
explain how our approach detects each category of malicious attacks respectively.
Detecting Software Attacks
The property monitor in our framework can help detection of software attacks to
hardware. In the property monitor, a set of system properties and security policies
are enforced. By verifying these properties at runtime, malicious driver commands
which violate the property can be detected.
Detecting Hardware Attacks
• Detections of DoS. When the device generates an invalid inputs to the driver
or the device stops working, its interface state is incorrect. In HW/SW comonitoring, the invalid interface state will lead to interface inconsistencies
between the hardware device and the FDM. Therefore, our runtime device
checking can successfully detect DoS attacks.
• Detections of stealing user privacy. The hardware trojan which steals encryption keys ﬁnally has to employ the network device to send over the key.
In Ethernet adapters, there are several registers, called statistics registers,
which record counts of packet receiving and transmitting. Hardware trojans
are usually embedded in its own hijacked module, which cannot easily manipulate the Ethernet adapter to avoid recording extra packet transmission.
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In this way, there are inconsistencies of statistics registers. By detecting
these inconsistencies, the device checker in our framework can detect the
underlying user secrete leaks
• Detections of code injection. As mentioned in Section 6.3.1, a large MMIO
reserved registers are an ideal location for the hardware trojan to place their
code to be executed, as this will not aﬀect the normal system work ﬂow.
Once the injected code has been placed in MMIO interface, there must be
an inconsistency of reserved registers between the device and the FDM. By
monitoring reserved registers, our device checker can uncover the malicious
behaviors over the reserved registers including code injection.
In the evaluation section, we simulate the concrete scenarios for each type of
malicious attacks. The results show that our framework can detect them successfully (see Section 6.4.2 for more details).

6.4

EVALUATION

This section evaluates our approach from three aspects. First, we simulate four
hacking scenario through HW/SW interfaces. By applying our framework, we
demonstrated that our approach can successfully detect malicious attacks through
HW/SW interfaces in reasonable delays. Second, we present several real device
bugs and driver bugs, which shows that HW/SW co-monitoring detects real defects
and vulnerabilities. Third, we evaluate the overhead introduced by our framework,
demonstrating our approach is eﬃcient.
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6.4.1

Experiment Setup

We have performed our experiments on a workstation with a dual-core Intel Pentium D Processor with 4GB of RAM and Ubuntu Linux OS with 64-bit kernel
version 2.6.38. We applied our framework to four Ethernet adapters and their
FDM generated from their QEMU virtual devices. Information about these devices and their FDM are summarized in Table 6.1. The FDM size is measured in
Lines of Code (LoC).
Table 6.1: Devices and FDMs for HW/SW co-monitoring
FDM
Devices

Basic Description
Size (LoC)

RealTek rtl8139

2211

RealTek 10/100M NIC

Intel eepro100

1032

Intel 10/100M NIC

Intel e1000

1432

Intel Gigabit NIC

Broadcom bcm5751

2103

Broadcom Gigabit NIC

Table 6.2: Summary of software attack injection
Driver
rtl8139

Property Description
The driver should not start new transaction

Consequence
Device hangs

when another transaction is in progress
eepro100

The driver should not issue START while

system hangs

the device is working already
e1000

The driver should not issue command when

Device hangs

MDIC is not clear
bcm5751

The driver should not start new EEPROM
transaction when previous update is not ﬁnished

Device hangs
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Table 6.3: Summary of detected bugs
No.

Description

Dev./Drv.

Num.

eepro100

1

e1000

1

1

Driver writes a value to a read-only register.

2

Driver updates the reserved register bits

3

Device updates reserved registers

eepro100

2

4

Device updates reserved registers

e1000

2

6.4.2

Attacks Detection

To demonstrate the capacity of catching malicious attacks, we injected several
malicious attacks issued from both devices and drivers. To simulate malicious
hardware, we modiﬁed the QEMU virtual devices which emulates the devices listed
in Table 6.1. By using virtual devices, we can easily injected our hacking scenarios.
On one hand, our virtual machine acts as a real physical machine where modiﬁed
virtual devices act as malicious hardware. On the other hand, our framework
utilizes the FDMs specifying the correct hardware behaviors. Malicious behaviors
can be detected as there are inconsistencies between the generated FDMs and the
injected virtual devices. To simulate malicious software, we directly modify the
Linux drivers.
We simulate three malicious attacks which are all described in Section 6.3.1.
We elaborate on more details as follows.
• Software Violation of System Properties (SVSP). The invalid software commands can easily hang or crash the device. We modify the drivers
to issue malicious commands violating the system properties. Thereby the
device or the system hangs. For each driver, we simulate one violation of
a system property. The system properties violated and the consequence of
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corresponded violations are summarized in Table 6.2.
• Hardware DoS Attacks (HDoS). We simulate a hardware trojan in
QEMU virtual devices. By sending a special UDP packet to the target
system, the hardware trojan is triggered, which issues an attack making the
device stop working and unresponsive to any incoming driver requests.
• Hardware Device Attacks (HDA). As Section 6.3.1 describes, a hardware trojan can inject code through DMA attacks through device interfaces
exposed to the system. In the evaluation, we simulate a hardware trojan
which takes over the OS by injecting code through DMA attacks.

Time(seconds)

1.2

1

HCI
HDoS

0.8

SVSP

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
eepro100

rtl8139
SVSP

e1000
HDoS

bcm 5751

HCI

Figure 6.6: Time delayed in detecting attacks

The results show that our framework successfully detected the malicious attacks. Figure 6.6 shows the corresponded delay in seconds which means the time
from the attacks occurs to the attacks have been detected. According to Figure 6.6,
we can clearly see that the delay is small in eepro100 and rlt8139 while it is relatively high in e1000 and bcm5751. The reason is because eepro100 and rtl8139 are
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all 10/100M adapters which have smaller interface memory, comparing to e1000
and bcm5751. As a result, the sizes of captured registers are smaller in eepro100
and rtl8139, which incur less overhead at runtime.
6.4.3

Bug Detection

Our approach can detect errors from both devices and drivers. We discuss device
bugs and driver bugs respectively.
• Driver bugs. In the four Linux drivers with their devices, our approach detects two real driver bugs. This two bugs generally violates system properties and can cause serious problems. For example, in the second driver bug,
updating the reserved registers is the same behavior as the code injection
example we demonstrate in Section 6.3.1.
• Device bugs. We discovered four real device bugs, which are all related to unspeciﬁed hardware behaviors, e.g., the register values are changed randomly
and reserved register bits are touched. This phenomenon is the same as code
injection through reserved registers. As these behaviors are unknown to the
system and device drivers, which should be considered as security threats.
Summary. All the bugs discovered occur on HW/SW interfaces, and involve
interactions between drivers and devices. By discovering these bugs, it demonstrates the capacity of our framework in detecting the bugs and malicious exploits
crossing HW/SW boundaries. Furthermore, when such a bug happen, it is hard
to identify which side of device/driver goes wrong. For example, invalid software
command can drive the device hang. It appears like a hardware error rather than a
software defect as the device is unresponsive. However, our framework can clearly
identify which side is wrong and the reason. Therefore, our approach is not only
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useful in detecting bugs but also helpful in troubleshooting the bugs.
6.4.4

Performance

In this section, we evaluate the overhead introduced by our HW/SW co-monitoring
framework. We mainly focuses on CPU and memory usages. We evaluate CPU
and memory usages under three test cases. These test cases are common usages of
an Ethernet adapter, including “load driver”, “scp ﬁles”, and “reset device”.
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Figure 6.7: CPU and memory usages of test cases under NAT. and MON. conﬁgurations. The usages under NAT. conﬁguration are normalized to 1.

We compare the CPU and memory usages of two conﬁgurations. The ﬁrst
one is the native system without our co-monitoring framework, denoted “NAT”.
The second one is the monitored system with our framework, denoted as “Mon”.
Figure 6.7 shows the results, where the usages in NAT. are normalized to 1. The
results show that under most of test cases, our co-monitoring approach introduces
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reasonable overhead. In the “scp ﬁles” scenario, the CPU usages are large. The
reason is because under “scp ﬁles” incurs intensive data transfer as well as device/driver events, our framework is intensively executed and introducing large
overhead. Moreover, as the FDMs of e1000 and bcm5751 are more complicated,
the overheads on them are larger than other two devices. We discuss the potential
optimizations to minimize the introduced overhead in Section 6.6.

6.5

RELATED WORK

Our approach is close to the approaches described as follows.
Lei, et al. [38, 37] propose a post-silicon conformance checking approach to
checking if a virtual device conforms to its silicon device. It captures silicon device
traces at runtime and checks the conformance with the virtual device by processing
the captured traces oﬄine. We apply this technique to check if the device conforms
to the FDM at runtime. Our approach has two major improvements: (1) HW/SW
co-monitoring is an on-line approach, monitoring device/driver interactions while
the system is running; (2) we utilize a FDM as a golden reference abstracting
unnecessary details, which makes runtime checking eﬃcient.
Li, et al. [40] present an automata-theoretic approach to hardware/software
co-veriﬁcation. Such an approach models a hardware/software combination as a
BPDS by synthesizing a BA representing hardware and a LPDS representing software. It uses model checking techniques to explore the state space of BPDS to
detect property violations. In our approach, we use BPDS to represent hardware/software interface and conduct runtime veriﬁcation.
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6.6

SUMMARY

Our approach can be further improved in two aspects. First, how to eﬃciently generate a FDM with respect to the hardware speciﬁcation. Second, how to minimize
the overhead of co-monitoring.
FDM generation. Recently virtual prototypes are widely used to enable early
software development before silicon hardware is available [45]. The FDM and the
virtual prototype of a device are both rooted in the device speciﬁcation. Therefore,
we can reuse the implementations of the virtual prototype to build its corresponding FDM. Building FDMs from virtual prototypes has two beneﬁts. First, extending virtual prototypes avoids duplicated eﬀorts. Second, in the validation stage,
a virtual prototype usually has already gone through a number of conformance
checking iterations and has been thoroughly validated. Reusing virtual prototype
implementations can help develop high-quality FDMs. In future work, we will
developed a systematic approach to deriving the FDM from the virtual prototype.

Reducing runtime overhead. As we discussed in Section 6.4.4, the major
performance downgrade is caused by intensive device/driver events. As for each
driver request, our framework symbolically executes the FDM under the driver
request, intensive driver request traﬃc will lead to signiﬁcant overhead incurred
by symbolic execution. Therefore, if we can reduce the number of driver requests
triggering symbolic execution of FDM, the runtime performance will be improved.
A potential solution to address the performance issue is “caching” the driver request and FDM state transitions. Since the device and the driver often work under
repeated scenarios, for example, an Ethernet adapter and its driver repeatedly receive and send packets, the same driver request and FDM state often appear many
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times. For this reason, we can “cache” the driver request and FDM state transitions explored by symbolic execution of the FDM. If we encountered the same
driver request and the FDM state, we can directly fetch the FDM state transitions without invoking symbolic execution. Thereby, the overhead introduced by
symbolic execution will be reduced.
This chapter has presented a HW/SW co-monitoring approach, which monitors a hardware device and its driver simultaneously. By monitoring the device,
the driver, and their interfaces, the bugs and malicious behaviors appear over device/driver interfaces. We evaluate our approach on four devices and drivers. The
results are promising: (1) our approach detected all the malicious attacks injected
in devices and drivers; (2) our approach also discovered several real bugs from
both devices and drivers; (3) our approach introduced reasonable overhead into
the runtime system. The results demonstrate that our approach is eﬀective and
eﬃcient in providing an early detection of bugs and malicious exploits through
HW/SW interfaces.
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Algorithm 6.1 Device Checking(M)
1: SI , α ← receive state request()
2:

S ← construct device state(SI )

3:

/*Initialize FDM state V to be device state S*/

4:

V ←S

5:

while α = NULL do

6:

/*Symbolically execute FDM taking α at V state.*/

7:

G ← sym exec(M, V, α)

8:

SI , α  ← receive state request()

9:

S  ← construct device state(SI )

10:

H ← conf ormance check(G, S  )

11:

if (H = ∅) then

12:

report device error()

13:

abort()

14:

end if

15:

V  ← construct next State(H)

16:

V ←V

17:

α ← α

18:

end while
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

HW/SW interfaces are pervasive in all kinds of computer systems ranging from
smart phones, tablets to personal computers to cloud servers. These systems have
high requirements on reliability and security. However, assuring HW/SW interface reliability and security is diﬃcult, not only due to the intrinsic complexity of
HW/SW interfaces, but also various challenges posted in diﬀerent stages of the
computer system life cycle. At the post-silicon validation stage, HW/SW integration validation is challenging as it is lack of eﬀective methods for bug detection and
troubleshooting. At the system deployment stage, hardware transient errors, hardware trojans, and software virus make HW/SW interfaces insecure and unreliable
as well.
This dissertation research has successfully demonstrated that HW/SW interface
defects and vulnerabilities can be eﬀectively detected through the systematic covalidation over HW/SW interfaces. Moreover, our two-schemed assurance solution
has major potentials in addressing the challenges of the HW/SW interface assurance over the system life cycle: (1) the HW/SW co-validation facilitates HW/SW
integration testing/debugging at post-silicon stage; and (2) HW/SW co-monitoring
provides the foundation for continuously protecting HW/SW interfaces after the
system has been released.
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7.1

SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS

This dissertation presents a comprehensive solution for validating HW/SW interfaces over the system life cycle. The dissertation makes following major contributions:
1. Conformance checking with virtual prototypes. Conformance checking addresses two major problems in the current industry practice: (1) lack
of transaction-level validation methods for validating silicon hardware; (2)
Diﬃculty of migrating drivers from virtual platforms to the real silicon hardware. We discuss the contribution of conformance checking from these two
aspects. First, the state of the art post-silicon validation and debugging
mainly focuses on the circuit level implementations which requires embedding
hardware monitors into circuits. Conformance checking essentially provides
an eﬀective and light-weight method from the operating system level which
does not require any hardware support. Second, due to the inconsistencies
between the device and its virtual prototype, drivers developed over virtual
prototypes often do not work readily on silicon devices because of either silicon device bugs or driver bugs hidden on virtual devices. By detecting the
inconsistencies between the virtual prototypes and the devices, conformance
checking provides a systematic and eﬃcient way to (1) expose the virtual
prototype or device errors; (2) reveal the causes of driver bugs hidden on
the virtual prototypes. According to thees two contributions, conformance
checking technique is expected to have a broad impact on not only hardware
validations but also HW/SW integration testing.
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2. HW/SW co-validation framework. Our HW/SW co-validation approach
is built upon the conformance checking approach. It provides a comprehensive solution to address the challenges in HW/SW integration testing: (1)
lack of HW/SW interface observation; (2) diﬃculty in attributing HW/SW
interface bugs; (3) diﬃculty in troubleshooting HW/SW interfaces. First, our
framework employs the trace recorder, which eﬃciently observes the HW/SW
interfaces. Second, when encountering a HW/SW interface bug, based on the
conformance checking result, we can clearly see if it is a hardware bug. Moreover, by analyzing the property checking result, it will identify the bug as
a software property violation, i.e., a software bug or a hardware property
violation, i.e., a hardware bug. Third, our co-validation framework automatically analyzes the trace produced by the HW/SW interface, largely saving
human eﬀorts. Our co-validation approach based on conformance checking
can detect the bugs ranging from the devices, the virtual prototypes, and the
drivers.
3. Adaptive concretization. Symbolic execution and other formal analysis
techniques, such as model checking, often face the state explosion problem,
which incurs signiﬁcant overhead. To address this challenge, concolic execution and abstraction reﬁnement are two common ways which are often
used. Concolic (a portmanteau of concrete and symbolic) testing is a hybrid
testing technique that integrates concrete execution with symbolic execution. Abstraction reﬁnement is an iterative process where the target model
or program is abstracted ﬁrst, then it is added with more details when the
counterexamples are discovered. Adaptive concretization borrows the ideas
from both concolic execution and abstraction reﬁnement: (1) we partially
concretize the state variables of the model and make them symbolic again
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when a counterexample is discovered. Adaptive concretization essentially
provides an alternative approach in formal analysis to reducing symbolic execution overhead. It is particularly eﬀective for dealing with the case where
concretizations are correct most of time. Our research dissertation demonstrated that adaptive concretization signiﬁcantly improves the eﬃciency of
conformance checking and scales it to complicated hardware designs.
4. HW/SW co-monitoring. HW/SW co-monitoring is a relative new idea
which realizes runtime HW/SW co-veriﬁcation. The most important feature
of HW/SW co-monitoring is concolic exploration of the HW/SW interface
model, i.e., the BPDS. Concolic execution leverages the runtime execution
trace of the system to reduce the veriﬁcation overhead. We believe that
concolic exploration is a practical way to realize eﬃcient runtime veriﬁcation
over the system. The idea of concolic exploration can be applied to not only
runtime HW/SW co-veriﬁcation but also pure software or hardware runtime
veriﬁcation as well.
5. Evaluation. This dissertation research has been realized in two software
tools, DCC (Device Conformance Checker) and CoMon (Co-Monitoring).
These two software tools have been applied to 4 real industry hardware devices, the device drivers, and their reference models (virtual prototypes and
FDMs). They discovered 42 real bugs ranging from the devices to the drivers
and to the reference models. Although all these four devices have been released for several years, which have gone through rigorous testing procedures,
our approach is still able to ﬁnd these non-trivial bugs. All these results
demonstrate that our approach has a signiﬁcant potential in validating real
industry hardware and software designs.
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7.2
7.2.1

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Pre-silicon HW/SW Co-validation

Motivation. As virtual prototypes are widely adopted for early software development, HW/SW integration validation is generally moved forward from the
post-silicon validation stage to the pre-silicon validation stage where the silicon
hardware has not been available yet. At the pre-silicon validation stage, HW/SW
interface assurance is also challenging as due to following reasons: (1) the hardware designs including speciﬁcations, RTL designs, and virtual prototypes evolve
very quickly. It is diﬃcult for software developers to keep synchronous with hardware designs; (2) there is often a large divergence between a RTL design and its
corresponded virtual prototype since they are developed by separated teams. As
a result, there is always a concern that the driver developed over the virtual prototype might have hidden bugs which will be revealed in the post-silicon stage;
(3) although virtual prototypes are white-boxes which might help troubleshoot
HW/SW interface bugs, HW/SW interface debugging is still diﬃcult. There are
two reasons: ﬁrst, driver developers or system testers do not fully understand hardware devices and virtual prototypes; second, troubleshooting an interface bug is
still a time-consuming process. It requires sifting through logs recording HW/SW
interface interactions and even digging into virtual prototype internals.
Solution. Adapting our post-silicon HW/SW co-validation framework for presilicon co-validation is a promising direction to address the above problems. The
pre-silicon HW/SW co-validation entails three techniques: (1) conformance checking among the diﬀerent versions of virtual prototypes and device RTL designs;
(2) conformance checking between a RTL model and its corresponded virtual prototype; (3) property checking over the driver and the virtual prototype. These
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three techniques address the three challenges respectively: (1) conformance checking among diﬀerent versions help quickly identify the diﬀerences between each two
versions of virtual prototypes and RTL designs. This helps driver developers understand the new features and the reason why the driver does not work on the new
virtual prototype; (2) conformance checking between RTL and virtual prototypes
help detect bugs in both RTL designs and virtual prototypes thereby discovering
design defects at the early stage; (3) property checking and conformance checking
together can automatically analyze HW/SW interface traces and pinpoint the root
cause of a HW/SW interface bug. This will save human eﬀorts on troubleshooting.
Research Challenges. There are several research tasks to develop the pre-silicon
HW/SW co-validation: (1) the method for conformance checking among diﬀerent
versions of virtual prototypes; (2) the method for conformance checking among
diﬀerent versions of RTL models; (3) the method and algorithm for conformance
checking between a RTL model and its virtual prototype. For conformance checking between two virtual prototypes, ﬁrst, we can extract the simulation trace from
the virtual platform where one of the virtual prototypes is executed together with
its driver. Second, we replay the simulation trace to the other virtual prototype
and compare their states. For conformance checking between two RTL models, we
can use the same method as conformance checking of virtual prototypes. However,
there are two research problems which need to be addressed: ﬁrst, how to properly
extract the simulation trace and what information would be included? Second,
what is the algorithm to compare their states? As to conformance checking between a RTL design and its virtual prototype, a potential approach is to extract
the simulation trace from the RTL simulator, replay the trace to the virtual prototype, and check their conformance. Nevertheless, a RTL model is a clock-driven
model and virtual prototypes are usually modeled at transaction-level. A major
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challenge is how to properly sample the RTL model simulation trace and check the
conformance against virtual prototype.
7.2.2

Detecting Hardware Trojan and Malwares in Virtual Devices

HW/SW co-monitoring is demonstrated as an eﬀective method in detecting hardware trojans at the system deployment stage. However, the hardware trojans
should be discovered as early as possible. Therefore, it is also desired to detect
hardware trojans at the post-silicon validation stage. However, hardware trojans
manufactured in third-part IP modules are usually deeply embedded in the chip,
which are quite diﬃcult to triggered under the validation environment.
There are two major problems to be addressed for detecting hardware trojans:
(1) how to generate eﬀective test cases to trigger hardware trojans? (2) how to
eﬀectively discover hardware trojans when they are triggered? We plan to use
FDMs as reference models for test case generation and trojan detection. Our
approach entails following techniques.
1. Enhancing FDM with undeﬁned behaviors. FDMs have already been
demonstrated as eﬀective and abstract reference models in HW/SW comonitoring. A FDM models all the device correct behaviors deﬁned by
speciﬁcations. However, to detect hardware trojans, we should focus on the
hardware undeﬁned or even malicious behaviors which are out of boundary of
the FDM. Thereby the FDM should be enhanced to include not only correct
behaviors but also the undeﬁned and malicious behaviors.
2. Automatic test generation with FDM. Some existing approach [15] has
demonstrated that virtual prototypes can be used as references for generating high-quality test cases. These test cases can be used for testing silicon
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hardware. We leverage this idea for generating test cases to trigger hardware trojans with our enhanced FDMs. As a FDM deﬁnes unknown and
malicious behaviors of the device, corresponded test cases triggering these
behaviors can also be generated. These test cases can be applied to trigger
the hardware trojans in silicon hardware.
3. Conformance checking for detecting hardware trojans. To detect
hardware trojans when they are triggered, we apply our conformance checking approach over the FDM and the silicon device. The FDM services as
a reference model and the malicious behaviors appearing over the device
interface will be detected.
Malwares in Virtual Devices
Recently hyperviors or Virtual Machine Monitors (VMM) are widely used to provide system virtualizations in cloud computing. A signiﬁcant component of a
hypervisor or a VMM is a number of virtual devices which emulate the hardware devices for guest operating systems. Hypervisors or VMMs can be malicious:
malwares or virus in virtual devices can easily propagate into the guest systems
through HW/SW interfaces. Thereby it is also highly desired to detect malwares
in virtual devices. Our hardware trojan detection method can be also applied to
detect malwares in virtual devices.

118

REFERENCES

[1] Miron Abramovici, Paul Bradley, Kumar Dwarakanath, Peter Levin, Gerard
Memmi, and Dave Miller. A reconﬁgurable design-for-debug infrastructure
for socs. In Proceedings of the 43rd Annual Design Automation Conference
(DAC), pages 7–12, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
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